

CONFIDENTIAL

# NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES

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CONFIDENTIAL

# Governmental Affairs

WASHINGTON STAR  
9 July 1975

## Report Details Spy Growth

By Nicholas M. Horrock  
New York Times News Service

The CIA engaged in a major build-up of its domestic intelligence operations during the Nixon administration, according to a report the agency submitted to President Ford in December and released by the CIA for the first time last night.

In an unexpected disclosure, the CIA made public the report that its director, William E. Colby, sent to Ford Dec. 24. It is a part of a broader analysis of the agency's involvement in illegal domestic intelligence operations and other wrongdoing, and was compiled for internal use at the request of Colby's predecessor, James R. Schlesinger, in May 1973. Schlesinger is now secretary of defense.

The documents did not mention CIA involvement in political assassinations or plots to kill foreign leaders. However, authoritative

sources have said that the original reports prepared for Schlesinger contained material on this subject. This material was given to the Rockefeller commission, to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and to Ford, but has not yet been made public.

**THE RELEASE** of the report came as a surprise in the continuing flow of information about U.S. intelligence operations.

According to a White House spokesman, Colby received Ford's permission to release the documents about three weeks ago. But the White House said it was unaware that he had chosen to release them last night.

A CIA spokesman said the technical difficulties of reprinting large numbers of documents resulted in its reaching the news media in mid-evening. The result, however, was to deprive most East Coast morning newspapers from carrying significant stories in their first editions and meant that the extensive evening network news programs were over when the release reached them. There was no prior notice that the report was to be made public.

According to these newly released documents, two congressional figures, Sen. Stuart Symington, D-Mo., and Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi, D-Mich., were briefed on the details more than two years ago.

**THIS NEW MATERIAL**  
Continued several startling

disclosures:

● According to a memorandum dated June 1, 1972, the major increase in the staff and facilities of the Special Operations Group came after Nixon had taken office on Jan. 20, 1969. The unit was the core of a domestic CIA intelligence operation that has come under criticism for violating the agency's legal charter, which forbids the CIA to engage in spying within the United States.

This memorandum revealed that the major formal strength of the unit was provided in mid-1969, when it was increased from a group with two full-time professional staff members to 36 authorized positions. It was increased again in the spring of 1971, when 18 more positions were authorized. These operations, code-named CHAOS within the CIA, were begun under President Lyndon B. Johnson in 1967.

● The documents disclosed that the CIA recruited "paid informants" among construction crews working on its headquarters in 1960 and 1961 in order to prevent foreign intelligence services from planting secret electronic listening devices.

● The documents also revealed a memorandum dated Aug. 15, 1967, in which the head of covert operations for CIA at the time, Thomas H. Karamessines, suggested to CIA officials that Harry Rositzke and Richard Ober head what later become known as CHAOS. One or both of them had long been rumored to have led the super-secret domestic operations.

The half-inch thick release came more than a month after the publication of a report on CIA domestic activities prepared by an eight-man presidential commission headed by Vice President Rockefeller. Though the report shows no substantive new areas not mentioned in the Rockefeller commission report, it provides more insight into the internal moves at CIA.

**IT REPORTS**, for instance, a series of memorandums issued by Colby in 1973 aimed at halting unacceptable operations that he had discovered from reading the full internal report prepared under Schlesinger's order. He ordered, for example, that the agency stop breaking into premises, that it halt drug test-

ing on Americans and that it cease several electronic and surveillance programs.

The documents include a letter from Colby to President Ford dated Dec. 24, 1974, in which the CIA director said the agency had "inserted" spies into the American anti-war movement and developed 9,944 "counter-intelligence" files on American citizens. "As I stated to you on the telephone, Mr. President, you have my full assurance that the agency is not conducting activities comparable to those alleged in the New York Times article," the letter said.

"Even in the past, I believe the agency essentially conformed to its mission of foreign intelligence. There were occasions over the years in which improper actions were taken as noted above (in his letter), but I believe these were few, were quite exceptional to the thrust of the agency's activities, and have been fully terminated."

**THIS LETTER CAME** two days after an article in the New York Times on Dec. 22, 1974, quoted intelligence sources as saying that the CIA conducted a massive domestic intelligence and surveillance operation.

Two days after receiving the agency's report, Ford indicated through press

WASHINGTON POST  
10 July 1975

## Colby Claim Contradicted By Probe

By William Greider

Washington Post Staff Writer

Central Intelligence Director William E. Colby assured President Ford last winter that the CIA's secret 20-year program to open the mail of U.S. citizens was coordinated "from its inception" with the FBI, but that claim is contradicted by the Rockefeller commission's findings.

Colby's description of the mail program was first provided to President Ford in a private six-page letter last December when the CIA's domestic spying activities first became controversial. That letter was made public Tuesday evening.

Colby told the President

spokesmen that he had found that "nothing comparable" to the Times account had taken place.

In the ensuing Rockefeller investigation, in the early indications from congressional investigations and in the documents released last night, public awareness of the scope of CIA's questionable activities has grown. For instance, the new documents noted that the CIA had files on 14 past and present members of Congress, and it restated that the agency had conducted burglaries and wiretappings.

In the orders Colby issued in 1973, it is clear that he was concerned with stopping infiltration of other government agencies by the CIA, long-range letter opening and wiretapping projects and such telephone tapings as those conducted against news reporters in 1963 and the physical surveillance of newsmen in 1971 and 1972.

**THE DOCUMENTS CONTAINED** a series of "deletions," which, the CIA noted in a statement, were made to permit "unclassified" portions to be made public. Several of the deletions were large portions of the text, making reading and understanding the accompanying memorandums difficult.

cretely opening first-class mail in order to obtain intelligence data on Communist countries. "This program was initiated in 1953," Colby wrote, "and from its inception was fully coordinated with the FBI, which received much of its product."

The investigation of CIA domestic activities by the presidential commission chaired by Vice President Rockefeller reached a different conclusion about the CIA's coordination with the FBI. The Rockefeller report said the CIA had avoided telling the FBI about the program and did not inform it until five years later.

"In January, 1958," the Rockefeller report said, "the FBI approached the Post Office Department for the purpose of instituting similar coverage of mail to and from the Soviet Union. The Post Office Department brought the bureau's request to the agency's attention, and shortly thereafter CIA representatives met the FBI of the agency's opening mail project."

"Up to that time, the CIA had avoided telling the FBI about the project—and no one

terials derived from the project were disseminated to the FBI."

In general, Colby's six-page letter plus 58 pages of attached memoranda did not alter the general outlines of CIA domestic spying as it has become known in recent months.

The abrupt release of the secret documents was apparently related to a lawsuit brought by Morton Halperin of the Center for National Security Studies to obtain public access to the report.

Halperin's lawyer was scheduled to take a deposition yesterday from a CIA official, Charles A. Briggs, and was provided a copy of the Colby report in order to conduct the questioning.

Halperin, a former staff member of the National Security

Council, said yesterday Colby's December letter to the President "is a cover-up, just an absolute cover-up compared to his January report and [compared] to the Rockefeller report" and to the CIA's internal study of domestic activities.

The latter report Halperin was referring to is a voluminous report produced by the CIA inspector general in 1973, which went into the details of what individual CIA officers had reported as improper activities within the agency, including plans to assassinate several foreign leaders in the early 1960s. That inspector general's report has not been made public, but Halperin has pending a formal request for it under the Freedom of Information Act.

Halperin said the CIA has promised to make available portions of the inspector general's report as they are declassified, but so far he has not received any of the material. He intends to file another lawsuit if the material isn't made public he said.

The Colby report assured President Ford that the CIA was not conducting the "massive" domestic spying which it was accused of in a New York Times article last December. However, Colby went on to describe a voluminous system for secretly collecting data on American citizens involved in dissident political groups.

The CIA surveillance, intended to determine whether any foreign adversaries were

secretly directing antiwar agitation within the United States, was aimed at a broad target, according to the attached memos.

The CIA documents also revealed for the first time that when the intelligence agency built its headquarters in suburban McLean, Va., in the early 1960s, the agency paid construction workers to protect them against anyone planting electronic eavesdropping devices in building.

Colby's letter told the President the agency's domestic activities included developing "paid informants among construction workers at the time of construction of the agency building to protect against the placement of electronic taps therein."

NEW YORK TIMES  
10 July 1975

## Release of Colby's Report Stirs Confusion in Capital

By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 9 — There is growing confusion in Washington over why the Central Intelligence Agency made a midevening yesterday release of its internal report on domestic spying and exactly when President Ford authorized the intelligence agency to make the documents public.

Earlier this year Morton Halperin, a former member of the National Security Council staff who has been a critic of some C.I.A. activities, filed a lawsuit under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act to obtain the report.

His lawyer, William Dobrovir, was assured orally and in a letter from J. Roger Edgar, a Department of Justice lawyer representing the C.I.A., that the document, with certain deletions, would be turned over to Mr. Halperin prior to the taking of a deposition from agency officials. The first assurance came on June 20 and the second July 8, in a letter dated June 25.

Late yesterday, Mr. Dobrovir received word that he would receive the document, delivered to his home, by midevening. He did.

### Last-Minute Decision

Apparently sometime during that day, the agency also decided to make the document available to the general public. The decision, one agency official said, appeared to have been made at the last minute. He cited printing difficulties encountered in preparing enough copies for the various press agencies.

A White House spokesman said that the agency recommended three weeks or more ago that the Dec. 24, 1974, report be made public but that President Ford did not formally authorize the publication until

yesterday morning. A Presidential spokesman earlier was mistaken when he said that Mr. Ford approved the release of the report several weeks ago, the White House said today.

It appeared that the C.I.A. hoped to make the report public itself before it could be released as a result of the Halperin lawsuit.

The half-inch-thick report, with several "annexes," was delivered to President Ford by William E. Colby, director of Central Intelligence on Dec. 24, 1974, two days after The New York Times quoted government sources as saying that the

agency had conducted a massive domestic spying operation. In a covering letter to the President, Mr. Colby said, "As I stated to you on the telephone, Mr. President, you have my full assurance that the agency is not conducting activities comparable to those alleged in The New York Times article."

### 'Conformed to Mission'

"Even in the past," he went, "I believe the agency essentially conformed to its mission of foreign intelligence."

Mr. Colby has consistently denied the "massive" nature of C.I.A. domestic spying ever since.

But the report of the commission on the C.I.A. headed by Vice President Rockefeller, sketched a vast array of questionable agency domestic activities, including the maintaining of index files on 300,000 United States citizens and or-

ganizations in a 20-year-long program including illegal mail openings, burglaries, wiretappings and the keeping of files on members of Congress.

White House sources said that the President felt Mr. Colby characterized the activities in his report as completely as he could in view of the haste with which the report was compiled.

The "Colby report" released last night disclosed several new facets of the domestic intelligence operations. It disclosed the most significant beef-up of the staff and facilities of Operation Chaos, the core of the domestic activities, came after President Nixon took office.

It also said that the C.I.A. had recruited construction workers engaged in building its headquarters in Langley, Va., to prevent the placing of surreptitious listening devices.

NEW YORK TIMES  
10 July 1975

## File Said to Indicate C.I.A. Had a Man in White House

By JOHN M. CREWSON  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 9 — The staff director of the House Select Committee on Intelligence has seen documents indicating that a high-level member of the Nixon White House staff was reporting to the Central Intelligence Agency on activities in and around the Oval Office, according to a source close to the committee's investigation.

The source, who asked not to be identified, said that the classified C.I.A. materials viewed by A. Searle Field, the staff director, gave no evidence that the C.I.A. "penetration," as he called it, was known to Presi-

dent Nixon or those around him.

Representative Robert W. Kasten Jr., a member of the select committee, said later that "information presented to me by the staff" indicated that there had been similar "infiltration" by the C.I.A. into the Office of Management and Budget, the Treasury Department and the Commerce Department.

In another development involving the C.I.A., authoritative sources said, that Ashland Oil, Inc., permitted a spy for the agency to operate in Western Europe for some five years as

an official of the company. [Page 37.]

A five-page memorandum prepared yesterday by Mr. Field for the 10 select committee members and made available today to The New York Times contained a reference that the source said was based on the document in question.

The memo contained a number of recommended areas of investigation, including "questionable matters not bearing on legitimate C.I.A. functions, but bearing heavily on American citizens," among which, Mr. Field wrote, was "infiltration of the executive."

Several of the select committee members whose curiosity was piqued by the reference were reportedly briefed by Mr. Field yesterday and today on what lay behind it.

Mr. Field declined repeated requests from reporters today to elaborate on his use of the word "infiltration" or to say whether the White House had

been the agency of the executive branch to which he had referred.

A C.I.A. spokesman would only say that "there was no infiltration, quote unquote, there was no penetration, quote unquote, of the White House" by his agency during the five and a half years of the Nixon Administration.

The source said that while he was not certain, he believed the document that contained the suggestion of a high-level C.I.A. operative inside the White House had been a report prepared by the Inspector General's office of the C.I.A., possibly sometime in 1973.

#### Another Possibility

The source pointed out, however, that although a "logical" reading of the C.I.A. document would lead to the conclusion that the agency had placed a covert informer within the upper levels of the Nixon White House, there remained a "slim" chance that the language, which was not entirely explicit, "could possibly have been read another way."

He also confirmed an account

of the document yesterday in which Sam Donaldson, a reporter for the American Broadcasting Company, said that the C.I.A. infiltrator had ranked just below H. R. Haldeman, Mr. Nixon's chief of staff, and John D. Ehrlichman, his domestic adviser.

"It was the Oval Office" to which the man had had access, the source emphasized, and "not the White House."

#### Panel's Fate in Doubt

The future of the select intelligence investigating committee was plunged deeper into doubt today as the House Rules Committee met to decide the fate of the panel, which has been all but immobilized by the animosity between its chairman, Representative Lucien N. Nedzi of Michigan, and most of its other Democratic members.

Three weeks ago, the committee Democrats learned that Mr. Nedzi had been briefed a year earlier on political assassination attempts by the C.I.A. but, as head of a separate House subcommittee charged with overseeing the agency had taken no steps to investi-

gate the matter.

In an intramural committee move, the Democrats attempted to strip Mr. Nedzi of much of his power as chairman of the select panel.

Mr. Nedzi tried to resign his chairmanship, but his effort was rejected by the House. A resolution was introduced by Representative B. F. Sisk, Democrat of California, to abolish the select committee altogether.

Today, the Rules Committee heard several hours of testimony on the Sisk resolution from Democratic and Republican members of the select committee, none of whom wanted to see it done away with altogether.

Among the proposals they tendered were the creation of a new select committee with a new membership, a limit on the jurisdiction of the panel that would confine its investigation to the C.I.A. Alone, joining the House committee to a similar one in the Senate, and the creation of a stronger permanent body that would watch the

C.I.A.'s future activities but not investigate its past ones.

The Rules Committee, on which there was general agreement that the present impasse between Mr. Nedzi and the others was intolerable, will vote tomorrow on which of the several alternative courses to pursue in abolishing or restructuring the panel.

In a related development, the House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct voted today to begin an investigation of the circumstances in which Representative Michael J. Harrington, one of the select committee members, disclosed last year details of secret House testimony regarding covert C.I.A. political operations in Chile in 1970 and 1971.

Mr. Harrington, a Massachusetts Democrat whose access to similar classified materials has since been cut off by the House Armed Services Committee, of which the C.I.A. Oversight Committee is a part, called yesterday for such an investigation in the belief that it would vindicate his actions.

WASHINGTON POST  
4 July 1975

# CIA Is Hiring D.C. Lawyer For Hill Work

By John P. MacKenzie  
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Central Intelligence Agency is hiring Mitchell Rogovin, a Washington lawyer active in ferreting out evidence of illicit government surveillance, to help it deal with congressional investigations.

Negotiations are near completion for the CIA to retain the Arnold & Porter law firm and Rogovin, a partner in the firm since 1969, to consult with the agency about responses to the Senate intelligence committee and other congressional committees.

Rogovin, 44, a former assistant attorney general and internal Revenue Service chief counsel, has a reputation for independence and public opposition both to illegal government snooping and excessive government secrecy.

Washington lawyers interpreted the development as a sign that the CIA, which is under heavy attack for admitted illegal domestic surveillance and alleged involvement in assassination plots, will cooperate completely with con-

gressional investigators because, the lawyers said, Rogovin would insist upon cooperation.

Rogovin said last night that he would be representing the CIA "in its corporate capacity" but was also prepared to advise individual officials if that should be requested of him. Describing himself as "a new boy in school," he said he spent much of the day at CIA headquarters yesterday.

It was learned that the arrangement was extensively discussed at the firm over a period of several weeks, with emphasis on such questions as what became known as the "St. Clair problem" during former President Nixon's last days in office.

Attorney James D. St. Clair and his client, Nixon, were criticized for a working relationship that kept St. Clair in the dark about crucial information incriminating his client. Ultimately St. Clair, when informed of damaging recorded conversations, warned that if Nixon did not make them public, he would.

Kenneth C. Guidry, an attorney

Cause, said that on the basis of his work with Rogovin he was sure the lawyer would "push to be totally informed at all times" about the availability of information sought by Congress. "He's no babe in the woods," Guido said.

Also under discussion in recent weeks was whether Rogovin's work as general counsel for Common Cause and in cases questioning government surveillance and secrecy created a potential conflict of interest with his proposed CIA consultations.

Lawyers representing conflicting interests are ethically bound to stop representing one interest or the other.

Common Cause, which paid Arnold & Porter \$31,000 last year and has budgeted \$25,000 for the firm's 1975 legal services, was among the lobbyists pressing for creation of the intelligence committee headed by Sen. Frank Church (D-Idaho).

It has invoked the Freedom of Information Act to demand CIA Director William E. Colby's still-secret report to President Ford on the agency's domestic surveillance activity.

NEW YORK TIMES  
5 July 1975

## C.I.A. PLANS TO KEEP EQUIPMENT SECRET

Contents It Is Exempt From  
Justice Department Rule

WASHINGTON, July 4 (AP)—The Justice Department said it is studying the Central Intel-

ligence Agency's refusal to comply with a requirement that Government agencies describe their electronic surveillance equipment to the Attorney General.

A spokesman for the Justice Department said last night that the C.I.A. had notified the department last month that it did not intend to comply with the rule on the ground that the agency was not a "domestic agency."

Common Cause president David Cohen said the organization saw no conflict at this time but would watch the situation closely. Officials at the institute could not be reached but were reported angry and considering severing its 12-year relationship with the law firm.

Rogovin said he saw no conflict of interest between his CIA work and his representation of other clients, but added that it was up to the clients "to do what they want to do." He said he expected the CIA work to be very time-consuming.

lignce Agency's refusal to comply with a requirement that Government agencies describe their electronic surveillance equipment to the Attorney General.

A spokesman for the Justice Department said last night that the C.I.A. had notified the department last month that it did not intend to comply with the rule on the ground that the agency was not a "domestic agency."



The department, in a 1972 memorandum, required executive agencies to file annual reports giving inventories of their electronic surveillance equipment.

Robert Feldkamp, a spokesman for the Justice Department, said agencies such as the Agriculture and Commerce Departments and the former Atomic Energy Commission had complied, but not the C.I.A.

Mr. Feldkamp said that the question of C.I.A. compliance was under study by the Justice

Department, and that, "At this point, the department is not saying C.I.A. is incorrect."

John S. Warner, general counsel for the agency, said the memo applied to law enforcement agencies and that the C.I.A. was not such an agency.

#### Reorganization Proposals

Meanwhile, a White House official said proposals for reorganizing the intelligence community were being examined, including a suggestion that the

coordinator of all American intelligence agencies be someone other than the director of the C.I.A.

At present, William E. Colby is both Director of the C.I.A. and Director of Central Intelligence. The latter post puts him in charge of coordinating the C.I.A., the National Security Agency and the Pentagon's intelligence functions.

Some former officials of the C.I.A. have argued that few directors of the agency have

the time or influence to coordinate all the agencies effectively.

The White House official, stressing that this was "just one of many" proposals being considered, said another suggestion called for breaking the C.I.A. into two separate operations. One concerns the analytical mission involving open collection of data and the analysis of all available information. The other involves the covert collection of data and the clandestine operations designed to influence events in foreign countries.

Los Angeles Times

Thurs., July 3, 1975-

## Ford Considering Intelligence Czar for 7 Agencies

BY ROBERT L. JACKSON  
Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—President Ford is considering the creation of an intelligence czar to oversee the work of CIA Director William E. Colby and other agency chiefs, it was learned Wednesday.

A high Administration source said such a move might bring better coordination and efficiency to the far-flung U.S. intelligence community, which includes not only the Central Intelligence Agency and the FBI but the National Security Agency and four military agencies.

The Administration official, who declined use of his name, told The Times that Mr. Ford also wanted to improve the integrity of the embattled CIA, which has been criticized by the Rockefeller Commission and is being investigated by a special Senate committee.

Nationally televised Senate hearings into the CIA's activities are scheduled to begin in September.

The Administration source said he wished to dispel rumors that Mr. Ford and Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger were displeased with Colby. "Bill has done an extraordinarily good job under intense fire," the source said.

At the same time, a source on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities said he believed the White House was unhappy with Colby's generally cooperative attitude toward the investigation.

Colby recently gave the committee a batch of CIA historical documents which were called back by White House officials when they learned of the move, the Senate source said. The committee returned the papers, the source said.

Sen. Frank Church (D-Ida.), who heads the committee, repeatedly has complained that the White House has slowed his investigation through a time-consuming review of documents

to be turned over.

Disclosures of CIA domestic spying and other illegal activities have convinced Mr. Ford that "something has to be done, perhaps a restructuring of the agency itself," the administration official said. He said the President was considering the appointment of a prestigious figure from outside the government to assume "an overview role."

"What we need is better executive oversight," the official said, in an apparent reference to calls on Capitol Hill for improved "congressional oversight."

As he described it, the new intelligence czar, if Mr. Ford chooses one, would be a "person of stature" who would coordinate the work of the CIA with the internal security duties of the FBI and the foreign intelligence efforts of five Defense Department units.

These are the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Army, Navy and Air Force intelligence offices.

Agencies also belonging to the federal intelligence establishment include the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research and the Treasury Department.

According to this official, Colby is supposed to coordinate all U.S. intelligence gathering. But he has been unable to exert sufficient influence to resolve disputes between the various agencies, the official said.

Mr. Ford also is considering expanding the duties and staff of the CIA's inspector general, and making this officer responsible to a person higher than the CIA director, the administration source said.

In its report last June 10, the Rockefeller commission recommended that CIA directors be "individuals of stature, independence and integrity."

A presidential advisory commission headed by former Ambassador Robert Murphy recommended more recently that the CIA be directed by a person chosen from outside the agency.

In an interview with the Washington Post earlier this week, Mr. Ford said that there was "considerable merit" in that suggestion. But the President said there were no plans at this time to replace Colby as CIA director.

WASHINGTON POST  
9 July 1975

## \$98,968 Paid By CIA to Ashland Oil

By Jack Egan  
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Central Intelligence Agency secretly paid \$98,968 to the Ashland Oil Co. between 1968 and 1973 for undisclosed purposes, according to a special report submitted yesterday by the company to the Securities and Exchange Commission.

The brief reference to the CIA was contained in an attachment to the voluminous report, which primarily detailed more than \$1 million in illegal domestic political contributions and foreign pay-offs made by Ashland since 1967.

The 400-page Ashland report—prepared by three company directors with the help of Coopers & Lybrand, a large accounting firm—was filed with the SEC and the federal courts as part of a settlement reached last May with the SEC. The commission had charged the company with failing to account adequately for millions of dollars in questionable corporate expenditures.

"During our investigation, we became aware of receipt of funds by Ashland Oil, Inc., from the Central Intelligence Agency of the U.S. Government," Coopers & Lybrand said in a letter included in the appendix to the report.

The payments ranged from \$9,511 in 1969 to \$37,500 in 1972 for a total of \$50,468 in cash and \$48,500 in checks. The report did not say what the money was used for, and said the company had no records to substantiate the total funds received from the CIA.

"The money received from the CIA was absolutely unrelated to any illegal domestic political payments or foreign contributions made between 1967 and 1972," an Ashland spokesman said. Asked what the money was used for, he replied: "I can't say and don't

ally don't know."

The company and its board chairman pleaded guilty in 1973, to criminal charges brought by the Watergate special prosecutor's office in connection with contributions to the Nixon re-election campaign of 1972.

A CIA spokesman declined to comment.

Ashland, the country's biggest, independent oil refiner and 50th largest industrial corporation, had extensive and expanding foreign operations in Africa during the period in question — particularly in Libya, Nigeria and Gabon. Its Libyan holdings, however, were largely nationalized after the overthrow of the monarchy in 1969 by the military junta led by Col. Muammar Qaddafi.

A source familiar with CIA operations indicated that the agency probably paid the funds to Ashland to reimburse the oil company for employing CIA agents abroad as part of an agency deep cover operation.

He speculated that Coopers & Lybrand, who were hired to investigate questionable disbursements of funds by Ashland, ran across the CIA payments because Ashland may have used the CIA money for payoffs abroad. Such funds could be spent like laundered money, the origin of which could not be easily traced, he said.

The Ashland report filed yesterday documents more than \$800,000 in illegal contributions the corporation made to federal, state and lo-

cal government officials and political candidates in the United States between 1967 and 1972. It also lists \$275,000 in payoffs abroad, including \$190,000 in Gabon.

The report was carefully cleansed of the names of any of the recipients of the illegitimate funds, although Ashland in earlier court actions admitted paying \$100,000 to President Nixon's 1972 re-election campaign, \$6,864.65 to Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey (D-Minn.) in 1970 and 1972, and \$2,500 to Sen. John G. Tower (R-Tex.) in 1970.

Ashland executives also contributed \$50,000 in corporate funds in 1971 to the Democratic National Committee and its then treasurer, Robert S. Strauss, in anticipation of the 1972 presidential election.

Two documents, containing the names of the apparent recipients of both the domestic and foreign payments, were separately turned over to Ashland's board of directors, but a spokesman for the Kentucky-based oil refiner said it was "not the intention of the company to release" the documents.

One name that did appear in the report, however, was that of New York Gov. Hugh L. Carey. Ashland said it made a \$5,000 contribution to his gubernatorial campaign last October, but noted that this is legal under New York law. Corporations are able to make campaign contributions up to a maximum of \$5,000 in New York.

THE WASHINGTON POST

Friday, July 11, 1975

## The CIA on the CIA

IT IS EXTREMELY USEFUL to have now in the public domain the report which CIA Director William Colby hastily compiled and sent to the President two days after the New York Times published its account of the agency's domestic operations last Dec. 22. The Colby report adds little to what has since become publicly known about those operations. More to the point, a reading of it makes plain that little has since become publicly known that was not related at least in outline to the President by Mr. Colby on Dec. 24. In short, he obviously knew what had been going on at CIA. He was able to catalogue in only two days a long and complex history of activities that were either illegal, improper, or, at best, questionable.

It is instructive to ask how he could have been in a position to do this. The answer, evident from the Colby report, is that he and his predecessor as director, the present Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, had already made their own intensive and—we now can see—exhaustive inquiry into the CIA's questionable operations. In the Colby report there are published for the first time the internal documents establishing the corrective steps the agency had applied to itself some 18 months before word of those operations came to public attention. The first of these documents is Mr. Schlesinger's directive of May 9, 1973, ordering all employees (and inviting ex-employees) to report any current or past activities "which might be construed to be outside the legislative charter of this Agency." In a second document, dated Aug. 29, 1973, Mr. Colby issued "specific instructions" to deal with each of the "specific questionable activities which were reported as a result of the search made throughout the Agency." The 20-odd memos comprising these instructions—relating to domestic dissidents, drug experiments and all the rest—are in the Colby report.

The report does not—perhaps nothing can—end the rather tiresome and irrelevant argument over whether the CIA's domestic outrages were "massive," as the New York Times charged, or "few . . . exceptional to the thrust of the Agency's activities," as Mr. Colby replied. But the report does validate the much more important consideration that the Agency finally did bring into play a self-righting political gyroscope of its own. The clean-hands assurances of then-Director Richard Helms in 1972 are cited; the contradictions between these assurances and subsequent disclosures presumably help explain why the Colby report was so long in being released. But once the gyroscope did start working, under Mr. Schlesinger and Mr. Colby, it seems to have worked extremely well. Thus Mr. Colby could tell President Ford last December that "the Agency is not conducting activities comparable to those alleged" and that improper activities had been "fully terminated." Neither official disclosures nor leaks in the press have since given him cause to go back on that word.

All this, it seems to us, bears directly on the various inquiries still being conducted into the CIA. There is no doubt that new procedures for oversight, by other elements of the Executive branch and by the Congress, are essential. But there is also no doubt that no new system of oversight can replace the need for a sense of responsibility on the part of the people who lead the CIA, and those who work there. Quite the contrary: it is inconceivable that any system of CIA oversight conducted from the outside could ever be as effective as that practiced by conscientious professionals on the inside. If the supervision of the CIA cannot be left to the men and women of the agency, then neither can it be accomplished without them. The problem in seeing that the CIA does the job it is supposed to do, and only that, lies in finding the best ways for operators and overseers to cooperate with each other.

NEW YORK TIMES  
10 July 1975

## SPY SAID TO WORK FOR ASHLAND OIL

**C.I.A. Agent Held Employed  
as a Corporate Official in  
Europe for 5 Years**

**\$99,000 PAYMENT SEEN**

**Part of Money Held Mixed  
With Funds Used to Make  
Illegal Political Gifts**

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 9—Ashland Oil, Inc., permitted a spy from the Central Intelligence Agency to operate in Western Europe for some five years as an official of the company, authoritative sources said today.

The C.I.A. paid Ashland the nation's largest independent oil company, almost \$99,000 from 1968 to 1973 to reimburse the company for that part of the man's time and expenses involved in carrying out assignments for the agency, these sources said.

Part of the money, \$30,000, was paid in a lump cash sum to settle the C.I.A.'s financial dealings with Ashland after the operative returned to the United States and ceased to spy for the C.I.A., they said.

This money, one source said,

was intermingled with funds Ashland used to make illegal political contributions and as a result came to the attention of Federal investigators in 1973.

The C.I.A. agent, these sources said, was not originally infiltrated into Ashland's corporate structure. He was an employee, they said, of a concern Ashland bought in 1967.

### 'Patriotic Thing to Do'

Shortly after the purchase the C.I.A. approached Ashland officials and told them that one of the executives of the company was a secret operative for the C.I.A.. The C.I.A. asked Ashland to continue the relationship and the oil company agreed.

"They [at Ashland] thought it was the patriotic thing to do," one source said. The C.I.A. agent was paid a full salary by Ashland and all the documentation, Internal Revenue Service filings and other detail showed only that he was an employee of Ashland.

The agent, these sources said, operated in Western Europe both on behalf of Ashland and for the C.I.A. During this period the C.I.A. made a series of payments to Ashland, part of it in cash and part by check, to reimburse the company for the time and expenses the agent spent on C.I.A. missions.

After almost five years of undercover work the agent decided to leave the C.I.A. and move into private life entirely, the sources said.

### Money Intermingled

The C.I.A. paid Ashland a "final settlement" of some \$30,000 to close out the costs of the secret operation. The agent remained in the employ of Ash-

land and now lives in the New York area, these sources said.

Ashland officials placed part of this cash in a safe at their headquarters and it was intermingled with money the corporation had used for illegal political contributions and bribes of foreign officials.

After Watergate, Ashland came under investigation by the Special Prosecutor's Office and the I.R.S. Under the pressure of the I.R.S. investigation the company disclosed to the Federal agents that part of the slush money had come from the C.I.A.

The I.R.S., in turn, reported this to the office of the Special Prosecutor, then headed by Leon Jaworski. Later Ashland pleaded guilty to charges that the corporation had made illegal political contributions.

It thus fell among several companies that came under investigation of the Securities and Exchange commission.

### Connection Disclosed

Ashland ordered an internal audit completed by Coppers & Lybrand, as part of a settlement with the S.E.C., and in its report to the S.E.C., disclosed the connection with the C.I.A.

A spokesman for Ashland would only say that "the company's arrangement with the C.I.A. was terminated a number of years ago, and no arrangement now exists. Under an agreement with the C.I.A., Ashland cannot comment further." He specifically declined to confirm or deny what authoritative sources had said about the insertion of the spy in Ashland's ranks.

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has launched a sweeping investigation of C.I.A. covert operations that includes the agency's use of private companies as "covers" for espionage.

Sources within the committee and veteran intelligence officials have raised the question of whether such arrangements have compromised the regulatory agencies, misled the I.R.S. and given the C.I.A. unusual opportunities to learn about the internal affairs of companies in which it has placed operatives.

Spokesman for the S.E.C. said that the agency was still reviewing the report of Ashland's internal investigation filed yesterday. It was a supporting document in the report that brought the C.I.A. funds paid to the oil company to public attention.

Involved in the S.E.C. review of the document is the issue of whether the commission should press the company to disclose the names of the recipients of political contributions and payments here and abroad. The company's report lists the names in a separate schedule that was given to Ashland's officers but not to the S.E.C.

The S.E.C. is also considering in its review whether to ask Ashland to make public its relationship with the C.I.A. As part of that decision, the commission will weigh whether the company's payments from the C.I.A. can be categorized as "material" information that should be disclosed to Ashland's shareholders.

NEW YORK TIMES  
8 July 1975

## C.I.A. Allegedly Flew Unwitting Officials

By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 7—Intelligence sources said today that members of Congress, two Vice Presidents and other politicians had flown chartered flights on a Washington-based airline, unaware that the line was owned and operated by the Central Intelligence Agency.

Among those who used the airline were Hubert H. Humphrey, Robert F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, the sources said.

The politicians were also unaware that, over the years, most of the airline's personnel were employees of the intelligence agency, the sources said. Apparently, the politicians paid the full charter rate for the flights.

"It meant that C.I.A. had an unusual entree into the personal and campaign travel of some of the most important political figures in the country," one source said. "It could learn where they flew, with whom they traveled and, if the agency wanted to, it could record or get an employee to listen to what was said."

Over a number of years, these sources said, the air charter service flew "at least a dozen" members of Congress and, in two instances, carried a Vice President while in office. At one point, the organization was routinely chartered by the Democratic National Committee and at another by the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, the sources said.

The air service, called the Fairways Corporation, operates out of a small, plain office in the General Aviation Center at Washington's National Airport. Its president and chief pilot, Charles W. Bing, who is 51 years old, denied that the airline was owned by the intelligence agency.

He said it was owned by a group of former residents of Lynchburg, Va., who were now scattered across the country. He declined to name them.

Mr. Bing added, however, that the airline had a major charter contract from the Department of the Navy and often carried passengers in "Army or Navy uniforms" or officers in civilian clothes who might

be involved with the C.I.A. He said he could not rule out that the agency was connected with the contract.

Intelligence sources said that the airline was secretly created by the C.I.A. more than 20 years ago to act as an "executive airline" for the agency's officials and to carry out secret domestic missions where commercial or other charter carriers would jeopardize secrecy.

One source familiar with the operation said that the airline flew "regular runs" to a secret location in North Carolina that the agency maintained to care for its operatives who had had nervous breakdowns or other emotional problems. "These people were in pretty bad shape," this source said.

The airline also made flights to a secret training base of the agency at Camp Peary, Va., and to "numerous" other secret locations around the coun-

try, the source said.

#### Eavesdropping Denied

Throughout the years, Fairways attempted to "cover" its status as a C.I.A. "proprietary" airline by posing as a private air charter company and signing up regular air charter passengers. It carried business executives, basketball players, private groups and politicians. It was the political charters, however, that raised the concern of several intelligence officials.

Mr. Bing acknowledges that the company has carried political figures. He said that Mr. Humphrey and Mr. Kennedy had been passengers.

He denied, however, that this travel was involved in any way with the C.I.A., and he said he had never been asked to eavesdrop on a passenger or otherwise compromise their privacy.

Intelligence sources said the company's carrying of political passengers stretched back to "the fifties." At different times, the airline carried Lyndon Baines Johnson when he was Vice President, John F. Kennedy when he was a Senator, Mr. Humphrey while he was Vice President, and Robert Kennedy, these sources said.

Many political figures were unaware that they had been

flown on Fairways because the billing for the flight would have been made through Page Airways, a well-established non-C.I.A. charter service that also operates out of Washington.

Page often acts as a clearinghouse for charter services at National Airport, and sometimes passengers fly on planes that belong to another charter company even though the trip was arranged by Page.

#### Criticism Recalled

One source said that Senator Humphrey's flying on Fairways was particularly "ironic." Mr. Humphrey came under criticism when he was Vice President for his use of Air Force planes to fly around the country while speaking on behalf of Democratic candidates. To avoid this criticism, the source said, Mr. Humphrey chartered private flights for these trips.

"He was paying for the flights at the full charter rate, and I'm sure he had no idea that the airline was C.I.A.," the source said. But it is funny because here he was trying to avoid criticism for riding on Government planes and, boom, he's back riding on Government planes."

William Connell, who was Mr. Humphrey's executive as-

sistant in the late nineteen-sixties, confirmed that the then Vice President switched to private charter, paid for out of political funds, to avoid the criticism that Air Force planes were used for political activities. He said he could not recall the exact names of the charter companies that were used, but he did say that they had been cleared by the Secret Service.

#### Used by Democratic Groups

"If we had known it was a C.I.A. airline, I don't think we would have used it," Mr. Connell said. "First, this was what we were trying to avoid, and also, there are very sensitive political matters discussed on such flights."

Several sources confirmed that, over the years, the airline was also unwittingly chartered by the Democratic National Committee and the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee.

The three Fairways planes, which carry 14 or more passengers each, appear to be normal charter aircraft.

Often, groups using the planes arrange to be served liquor and meals as part of the charter flight. Fairways employs eight persons, Mr. Bing said, including four pilots. He said that neither he nor any other employees were C.I.A. per-

sonnel.

But other sources said that, over the years the "bulk of Fairways employees were employed by the C.I.A. on regular Government salary levels.

#### Senate Panel Investigating

An attempt was made to obtain comments from Woodrow W. Edmondson, the former president of Fairways, and several members of the board of directors. The only person who responded was Calvin A. Fallwell of Lynchburg, Va. Mr. Fallwell said Mr. Edmondson had recruited him for the board of directors "several years ago."

Mr. Fallwell said he did not believe the intelligence agency owned the airline, but he acknowledged that he owned no part of it and took no part in its operations.

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is known to be investigating Fairways, along with several other C.I.A. "proprietary."

For several years, the intelligence agency's entire "proprietary" system has come under criticism and scrutiny. The sources said that the C.I.A. owned several airlines, Southern Air Transport, Air America and a repair and a maintenance operation known as Inter-Mountain Air.

NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, JULY 9, 1975

## Rep. Harrington Defends His Disclosure of Secret Colby Testimony on C.I.A. and Chile

By JOHN M. CREWDSON

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 8—Representative Michael J. Harrington today defended as appropriate and responsible his disclosure to follow Congressmen last year of details of sworn secret testimony on the Central Intelligence Agency's political activities in Chile.

At a news conference, the Massachusetts Democrat denounced as "astonishing hypocrisy" a vote last month by the House Armed Services Committee, to one of whose members the secret testimony was given, to deny him future access to such sensitive classified materials.

The committee's action, Mr. Harrington said, implied that "an informed electorate is a threat to democracy, and that democracy is sometimes a threat to the free world."

"Peculiar as that may sound, it is the only way to explain this country's undermining of a democratically elected Government in Chile in the early nineteen-seventies and the subsequent effort to keep the matter quiet."

The Representative, who has been an outspoken critic of the C.I.A.'s covert political and paramilitary activities abroad, announced that he had taken steps—including a request to the House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct—that were intended to challenge the strictures of "a classification

system gone wild."

In answer to a question, Mr. Harrington conceded that, in relating to other members of Congress and a reporter the substance of the C.I.A.'s Chilean operation, he had violated a House rule against disclosing testimony taken in a closed committee session as well as his signed secrecy pledge.

But he insisted that "the important question here is not the rule, but what the rule was designed to prevent, a lack of knowledge" of the C.I.A.'s multimillion dollar effort to make it impossible for Dr. Salvador Allende Gossens, Chile's Marxist president, to govern.

Moreover, Mr. Harrington declared, "signing a secrecy pledge does not excuse a Congressman or any other citizen from reporting evidence of a crime. Ordinarily those who sign such agreements expect to see references to secret but legal activities."

"The enforcement of such an agreement to keep illegal activities secret is itself illegal."

Details of the testimony of William E. Colby, the Director of Central Intelligence, on the agency's Chilean operations first became public last September when The New York Times recounted Mr. Harrington's description of the testimony in a letter from him to Representative Thomas E. Mor-

gan, Democrat of Pennsylvania, who is the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

Mr. Harrington was asked to testify two weeks later about the source of The Times's report before a special session of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Intelligence, headed by Representative Lucien N. Nedzi, the Michigan Democrat who is also chairman of a select committee set up to investigate intelligence-gathering by Federal agencies.

Mr. Harrington told the subcommittee last September that neither he nor his office had been The Times's source of his confidential letter to Mr. Morgan. He said the letter had been an attempt to initiate a Congressional inquiry into Mr. Colby's "troublesome" account of the Chilean matter.

He acknowledged, however, that he had discussed various aspects of the Colby testimony with other members and with a reporter for The Washington Post, whom he described as a "personal friend," but in every case, he said, only to seek advice as to how the information might ultimately be made public.

Mr. Harrington said it was his impression after testifying last year on his handling of the Colby testimony that the matter had been "laid to rest," and he accused the Armed Services Committee of deciding

"to resurrect the whole affair" last month in connection with the continuing dispute in the House over the future of the Select Committee on Intelligence Activities.

He noted that the vote of the Armed Services Committee to halt his access to classified testimony and documents came last June 16, the same day that the House voted overwhelmingly to rebuff an attempt by Mr. Nedzi to resign the chairmanship of the select committee.

Mr. Nedzi's move came after the Democratic membership of the select committee attempted to diminish his authority following the discovery that, as chairman of the Armed Services subcommittee that oversees the C.I.A., he had been briefed a year earlier on some of the agency's attempts at political assassination, but had not explored the matter further.



BALTIMORE SUN  
10 July 1975

Marquis Childs

## CIA Follies Menace its Real Value

Washington.

In five weeks of travel abroad almost every newspaper encountered has played up the misdeeds, real or imagined, of the Central Intelligence Agency. For one American this has been embarrassing, and particularly when even polite foreigners get around to asking why we should be so bent on throwing off on an institution that must have served a useful purpose, since for 30 years the Congress had provided it with large funds and secret responsibilities.

At times it has had the color of the fantastic, not to mention the ludicrous. Poison cigars, poison rings, it might have come out of a *Boys World*. . . BW . . . edited by a junior assistant to Dracula. In the media game as it hits the CIA any number can play, and the bigger the odds against fact, or the relationship between truth and reality, the blacker the headline.

The CIA has performed over the years an important intelligence-gathering function. It has provided the raw material for intelligence judgments repeatedly closer to objectivity than the intelligence findings of the military that tend to tip the scales in favor of more and more military

hardware.

The danger, it seems to me, is that this valuable function may be lost in purging the follies that have grown like weeds in the vast compost heap of an agency beyond the grasp, it may well be, of any director. Able intelligence officers around the world are discouraged and depressed by what they fear is an end to their usefulness.

Take one such agent who must for obvious reasons be anonymous, but for whose integrity I can vouch. John Jones is serving in a post not so dangerous as, say, Beirut, but with plenty of hazards in the turmoil of the Middle East.

With a knowledge of Russian and three other languages, Mr. Jones has served in four previous posts during his 26 years with the agency. While he is properly restrained about his work, I would guess that it is chiefly concerned with Soviet activities both within the country and on the borders. The relationship between subversive foreign agents and terror would be part of his concern.

Since he began at a young age Mr. Jones has still 15 years or more to go before compulsory retirement at 65. In light of his experience and

his proven ability these should be his most useful years.

But he is seriously thinking of returning to Washington to resign. To my knowledge this is far from an isolated instance. Losing the ablest men with long experience will seriously cripple the agency.

What is the future of the CIA? Some opponents have said it should be abolished entirely. President Ford, in an interview last week, expressed his belief that the borderline of serious crippling damage to the intelligence community has been reached. He is acting responsibly, he believes, in passing on all relevant information to the Senate committee investigating the CIA, and beyond that there is not much he can do inasmuch as Congress is an independent body.

Senator Frank Church (D., Idaho), chairman of the committee, has shown every evidence of wanting to conduct a responsible inquiry rather than a television spectacular. This will be difficult, given the pressures for leaks and counterleaks.

A final resolution is a long way off. One answer might be to separate intelligence-gathering and analysis functions from the dirty tricks department. Given the idiocies of the

poison cigar and the red wig and false nose activities of such as E. Howard Hunt, there should be serious consideration as to the scope and the latitude of that department.

Those defending the need of the agency in both functions cite the estimated 400,000 agents of the Soviet's spy apparatus, the KGB, as against the 30,000 or so in the CIA. This is, of course, irrelevant. A secret apparatus operating in an open society might have expected the barrage that has hit the CIA. It is surprising only that it did not come sooner.

You can hardly imagine a front page story in *Pravda* exposing a luckless KGB agent who flubbed an attempt to pass a poison cigar to Senator Strom Thurmond (R., S.C.) in the Senate dining room. Except for a rare defector the worldwide operations of the KGB are shrouded in deepest secrecy. This advantage is offset in part at least by the KGB's heavy-handed methods.

No matter what name it goes by spying, is a dirty business and the chief spy can hardly qualify as a Boy Scout leader. This is the reality of American power in a divided world.

WASHINGTON POST  
2 July 1975

## In Defense of the CIA's Purpose

After nearly 35 years of association with the U. S. intelligence community, including 23 years service with the CIA, I must say that nobody has yet stated in public what it is really like to the great majority of those who work on the inside and who are not spies or clandestine operators.

It is the most exhilarating intellectual challenge that western civilization has devised since the great Renaissance. In the best tradition of Copernicus, Darwin, and Einstein, we were charged by the Congress of the United States with the mission of understanding the human world outside the U. S. and the uses that the human world makes of the physical universe around us. But we were not left alone to tackle that super-human task. The world itself imposed an extra challenge; i.e. much of the world tries to hide what it is doing or to mislead us concerning its meaning. In other words, we were given an almost impossible task and told to do it in spite of everything that others could do to impede our progress.

In our efforts to meet this double challenge we have tried every analytical tool that could be developed by the intellectual community and devised many ingenious programs for the col-

lection of the facts needed in our analysis. Among them were clandestine operations of incalculable value.

The atmosphere inside the CIA and other intelligence organizations has been that of a crusade — a crusade searching for the truth. This atmosphere of search for intellectual truth was made possible by the highest standards of personnel security. An effort was made to hire those who seemed to be the brightest and the most intellectually responsible. In addition, because we knew that we had all been carefully screened, we were confident that we were dealing with people who had no hidden motives.

Security screening did not produce a nice smooth population of people who thought alike. We were all strong personalities who were competing for what we thought was right. The result was a constant debate, but it was a debate that we knew that we could trust. The truth was not always obvious and we sometimes made mistakes, but we knew that nobody was going to get personal gain from winning a specific argument. He would get ahead only if he were demonstrated to be right over an extended period of time. In addition, we knew that nobody was secretly trying to distort or mislead the

debate for hidden political motives. An argument might be advanced by partisans for a specific weapons system or a specific policy, but such arguments were advanced openly.

The atmosphere of intellectual freedom was exciting. During the McCarthy era, for example, we felt complete immunity to the witch-hunt hysteria. In our intellectual sanctuary, we did not have to develop the tough hides and sharp claws that public exposure seems to require. Now, unfortunately, some people have seized on some peripheral activities that could be made to seem sensational and are using them in a way that can only damage our search for the truth.

If the press is our counterpart among the public in this search for truth, then the press must try to understand that the mission of CIA is to get and report the truth to our duly constituted leaders in spite of everything that ignorance and willful distortion can do to frustrate us.

W. A. Tidwell,  
Bris. Gen., U.S.A.R. (Ret.)  
Fairfax.



NEW YORK TIMES  
9 July 1975

# On Behalf of the Public's Right to Know

By Morton H. Halperin

WASHINGTON—In June, 1974, Representative Michael J. Harrington was permitted to read the transcript of a secret briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence, William E. Colby, on American covert intervention in Chile.

What the Massachusetts Democrat, long a critic of the Central Intelligence Agency, read shocked and appalled him. The United States, he learned for the first time, had been actively involved in seeking to prevent Dr. Salvador Allende Gossens from coming to power and sought to undermine his control after he became President in what was conceded to be a free election. Mr. Colby's briefing described efforts to bribe members of the Chilean Legislature. At least some of these actions violated American treaty commitments under the United Nations Charter and the Rio Pact to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of other nations.

More shocking was the fact that the description of the American role in Chile given by Mr. Colby to the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Intelligence contradicted in important respect statements made publicly by leading Administration officials, including Henry A. Kissinger, and testimony given under oath by the outgoing Director of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms.

It was clear to Mr. Harrington that the committee intended to do nothing about the information it had received except perhaps to ask some more questions about Central Intelligence Agency activities elsewhere. The other committees that had received contradictory testimony were not notified; the Justice Department was not asked to explore possible perjury. The transcript was to remain locked in committee files.

In order to get access to Mr. Colby's testimony Mr. Harrington had signed a committee secrecy agreement specifying that he could not pass the information on to anyone, not even colleagues or cleared staff members. This produced the dilemma that led to the recent Congressional efforts to

censure Mr. Harrington and to his counterattack launched this week.

Mr. Harrington's problem was similar to Dr. Daniel Ellsberg's after Dr. Ellsberg read the Pentagon Papers. The Congressman was in possession of information that showed that the executive was deceiving the public and that he believed would have a significant effect on policy if released, but he had made a commitment not to disclose the information.

Surprisingly, his solution was the same as that of Dr. Ellsberg: Give the information to the liberal Senate Foreign Relations Committee and prod it to hold hearings. The committee's reaction was the same: It put the material in its files and did nothing. The members of that committee felt committed to the Congressional tradition that information classified by the executive branch could not be made public by the Congress.

After letting the matter of how the information regarding Chile eventually reached the press lie unexplored for almost a year, supporters of the C.I.A. in the Congress decided to move against Mr. Harrington. By denying him access to Armed Services Committee secret files and by asking the ethics committee to investigate his conduct, they acted to divert attention from C.I.A. covert operations abroad and illegal activity at home to the question of a Congressman's violation of a secrecy agreement. Mr. Harrington's refusal to quietly accept this criticism will now force the Congress and the public to face the issue he said yesterday that he had taken steps to challenge the strictures of "a classification system gone wild." Where should loyalties lie in such a situation?

We would all prefer a world in which the executive does not violate treaty commitments abroad or deceive the public and infringe on constitutional rights at home, and in which the public and the Congress are given all the information needed for informed public debate and evaluation of Administration actions. But we do not live in such a world.

Until we do, Congress and the public will depend on the acts of conscience of those who come to know,

to inform the rest of us about how we are being deceived. We are in the debt of not only Daniel Ellsberg and Mr. Harrington, but the still-anonymous C.I.A. official who turned to the press when the C.I.A. and the Congressional oversight committees continued to conceal the illegal domestic activities of the agency, and to others. Such acts are, and must be, rare coming only at the call of conscience in face of clearly outrageous deception.

The lesson here is clear: We cannot depend on such acts to keep us informed and should not be asking others to accept the risks involved. Rather, Congress must legislate to change the situation. Executive branch actions that constitute criminal offenses must be spelled out clearly: violations of treaty obligations, violations of the charters of organizations such as the C.I.A., deliberate deception of the Congress or the public on important policy issues, spying on organizations and individuals who are not suspected of crimes, planning covert operations in democratic societies if not everywhere.

One could go on, but the point is that the list must be precise and then Congress must do two other things: It must create a permanent special prosecutor to investigate crimes of the executive branch, and it must make it a crime not to report known or suspected violations of these laws to the special prosecutor.

Mr. Helms told the Senate Watergate committee that until recently it had not been considered a crime to obey Presidential orders. What he meant was that no one ever went to jail for such crimes. Some of the Watergate conspirators did, but that change must be made permanent.

If all that is done, we will have less need to rely on acts of conscience to keep us informed. At least, until then we should not permit attention to be diverted from the crimes of the executive to the acts of courage that fulfill our right to know.

*Morton H. Halperin directs a project on national security and civil liberties for the American Civil Liberties Union and the Center for National Security Studies.*

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, July 14, 1975

## Washington Whispers®

★ ★ ★

When Mr. Colby testifies in secret on Capitol Hill, CIA technicians inspect the hearing room in advance to make sure it isn't "bugged." While Mr. Colby is testifying, two CIA experts, in an adjoining room, operate an interference device as further protection against electronic eavesdropping.

★ ★ ★

NEW YORK TIMES  
10 July 1975

# The Teller Of Truth

By Anthony Lewis

Last Dec. 22 The New York Times published a story by Seymour M. Hersh saying that the Central Intelligence Agency had conducted a "massive illegal domestic intelligence operation." The story created a great stir, leading to Congressional and Executive investigations of the C.I.A. But it also aroused extraordinarily sharp attacks on Mr. Hersh and The Times, and not only from the predictable right.

The Washington media world buzzed with sour talk about the story. Time magazine, reflecting the mood, said there was "a strong likelihood" that the piece was "considerably exaggerated and that The Times overplayed it." Charles Bartlett, the columnist, said "knowledgeable quarters" in the Government found it "highly exaggerated." On the right, John D. Lofton Jr. later wrote with relish that a Pulitzer Prize jury had turned down the Hersh story as "over-written, over-played, under-researched and under-proven." Lofton added: "By implication, the C.I.A. has been found innocent of the charges against it reported by Hersh."

Last month the Rockefeller Commission reported that the C.I.A. had indeed carried on illegal domestic activities on a large scale. I was abroad at the time and wondered whether Mr. Hersh's critics had been big enough to admit their mistake. The answer appears to be no, and some comment is in order.

First, there can be no doubt any longer about the correctness of the Hersh story—or of The Times' decision to play it prominently. The Rockefeller

## ABROAD AT HOME

report, the work of eight conservative men, confirmed the story in substance and detail. And now the C.I.A. has made public its own report to President Ford, offering further confirmation.

The Rockefeller report said Operation CHAOS—it disclosed the name—had focused on the antiwar movement and compiled files on thousands of American citizens, as Hersh wrote. Was it "illegal," "domestic," "massive"? The commission said the operation had "unlawfully exceeded the C.I.A.'s statutory authority" and piled up "large quantities of information on the domestic activities of American

citizens," . . . a "veritable mountain of material."

The commission also confirmed Mr. Hersh's statements that the C.I.A. had wiretapped, opened mail, infiltrated legitimate organizations. The tone of its report was carefully dead-pan, but the substance was hair-raising.

The New Republic published a thorough analysis by Morton Halperin comparing the Rockefeller findings and the original Hersh report. If anything, Hersh had understated the C.I.A.'s horrors. And so one must ask why there were such attacks on the story originally, and have been so few apologies lately.

One reason may of course be jealousy of the most important and successful investigative reporter in the business. Then there is ideology. There are people on the right who would like to have a secret police system in the United States, and who think we would have been better off not knowing that American soldiers massacred women and children at My Lai.

Such feelings can produce blinding animus. A curious example was provided by William Rusher, publisher of The National Review. After sitting next to Mr. Hersh on a television show, Mr. Rusher described him as "a tall, bulky type with a personality to match." Mr. Hersh is in fact a slightly built man, with the personality not of a bear but of a nervous badger.

Another reason for the pique at Mr. Hersh may be the special relationship that some in the Washington press corps have long favored with top C.I.A. men. There is a reluctance to attack those with whom one dines. Hersh, like Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward in Watergate, is an outsider who does not play the social game.

Richard Helms, the former C.I.A. director, has been a particular intimate of some journalists. Charles Bartlett wrote last January that Helms could "be counted on to show [investigators] that he took strong measures to keep his agency on its side of the legal line." Mr. Helms may be a charming dinner partner, but he was also a principal author of the C.I.A.'s lies and illegalities.

Finally, some who criticized Mr. Hersh may not understand the limits on the function of investigative reporting. They complained that he had not produced conclusive evidence of C.I.A. wrongdoing. But journalists do not have subpoena power, and no one should expect them to perform like courts. It is enough if they call attention to wrongs and provoke correction by the formal system of law and politics. These wrongs had been called to official attention, but the politicians did nothing until Seymour Hersh forced their hand.

It is good to hold the press to meticulous standards, but a little odd to do so while winking at official cruelties. William Colby, the present C.I.A. director, testified last February: "This operation was neither massive, illegal, nor domestic, as alleged." With his standard of truth, how long would he last as a journalist?

WASHINGTON STAR  
2 July 1975

## CIA Moves Up to Him, Levi Insists

Associated Press

Atty. Gen. Edward H. Levi says that he, and not President Ford, will decide whether to bring criminal charges against CIA personnel involved in assassination plots or domestic wrongdoing.

"The attorney general has made clear to the President that he (Levi) will retain any prosecutorial discretion," Justice Department spokesman Robert Feldkamp said. "They did discuss this and Ford had no problem with it."

Feldkamp was questioned about an apparent conflict between the position Levi outlined to a group of reporters last Wednesday and Ford's published remarks Monday.

Levi said last week, "I would feel obligated to tell the President to communicate the position of the department, but I would not expect the President to tell the department what to do."

Ford was quoted as saying he would "expect to be informed" by Levi prior to any prosecution of government officials for past CIA activities and "would certainly want to discuss the pros and cons" of any criminal charges.

Levi's reaction to that remark was that "there is plenty of room for the two statements to coexist," Feldkamp related. "The President certainly would be notified routinely if any prosecution the department would initiate would deal with national security or foreign policy."

But he added that Levi told the President in a meeting two weeks ago that "the decision had to be made here." Levi would not seek the President's permission to proceed with criminal charges, Feldkamp said.

WASHINGTON POST  
2 July 1975

Most Believe Their Profession Unfairly Maligned

# Ex-CIA Agents Fret Their Work Not

## Understood

One recent night, a half-dozen local members of David Phillips' new association of former spies gathered around the coffee table in his living room to "go over our by-laws, find out about our tax exempt status and chat."

They were of roughly similar ages as Phillips, and also lean and tan—except for Arthur Jacobs, a McLean attorney, who was older and had an Einstein-like shock of white hair and was charmingly self-deprecating ("I should be preserved in plastic in the Smithsonian") and Lewis Regenstein, who is younger and is the author of a book called "The Politics of Extinction." "NOT about the CIA," he said. "It's about other endangered species."

Regenstein resigned from the CIA after 3½ years, he said, to follow his interest in "an equally frustrating subject—environmental problems. 'My friends, of course, ask me if I'm spying on the environmental movement.'"

One of the men asked not to be photographed or identified by name, because his

current neighbors do not know he is a retired spy.

The Association of Retired Intelligence Officers (ARIO) had had its first official meeting a week or so earlier at the Summer Village sales center in Bethesda, with over 50 slightly edgy new members in attendance.

The membership, totaling 250 so far, is concentrated, not surprisingly, in the Washington area. It extends as far south as Florida, with a sprinkling across the Midwest and a few members in the far west. Each has paid at least \$10 dues, "but the average is closer to \$20," said Phillips, "and we got one donation for \$200."

The other members share Phillips' belief that their profession has been unfairly maligned and his determination to defend it as best they can without revealing what they consider vital secrets.

At Phillips' house that night, they spoke with flaring passion about the need for public understanding of the espionage business—but

in their words was an undercurrent of meaning comprehensible only to them, through their bond of strange experience.

At the request of a visitor, they gamely traded a slew of spy jokes before they came up with a couple that could be appreciated by outsiders (or could be printed).

"One joke that used to go the rounds back when the agency's phone number was unlisted was that the only way you could get the number was to call the Russian embassy," said Dr. Lester Houck of Washington, who once taught Greek and Mediterranean archeology.

A couple of the men had stories about friends they had met socially, had routinely deceived about where they worked, and subsequently run into in the halls at CIA headquarters. "We'd both been working for the agency and lying to each other about it," recalled James Flannery, of Alexandria.

They each echoed Phil-

lips' statements about the lack of status and recognition, and especially about the hardships on families. "That's why I took early retirement at 54," said Estey. "To give my wife 10 good years—maybe."

Despite these familiar laments, and despite what Phillips has called "the distemper of the times," which throws a retroactive cloud over all their activities, the men agreed with Flannery when he said firmly: "If I had it all to do over—I wouldn't do it differently."

Flannery spoke almost reverently of his plan to put up a cabin near Cape Hatteras, N.C. "I will report on domestic activities on the Outer Banks," he said softly, "and send back intelligence on when the blue fish are running."—KATHY SAWYER

WASHINGTON POST  
2 July 1975

# CIA Spy's Life an Open Secret to Family

By Kathy Sawyer

Washington Post Staff Writer

Todd, the rambunctious blond 4-year-old who was born in Brazil, was hiding behind a chair in the corner of the living room, making odd noises. Two other youngsters were making snacks in the kitchen where suddenly could be heard a loud crash of dishes.

For their father, David Atlee Phillips—a fittingly dashing spy who saw Fidel Castro march into Havana, was in Mexico City when Lee Harvey Oswald made his mysterious visit, and directed covert operations in Chile before the overthrow of President Allende—babysitting in his suburban Maryland home on a weekday afternoon was an adjustment.

He could have been any middle-aged father riding out a white-collar job lay-off during a national economic slump, except for a few clues: a mounted map of the United States peppered with blue-headed pins; original art and artifacts from several Latin American countries, and a massive autographed volume of "Canto General" by the Chilean poet Pablo Neruda, opened to a selection entitled "La United Fruit Company."

After 24 years as a clandestine CIA

operative of some importance, Phillips, 52, has left the embattled intelligence agency in order to help save it. His already well publicized plans to defend it include personal appearances, a proposed book and the formation of the Association of Retired Intelligence Officers, whose locations across the country are marked by the pins in the U.S. map.

Because it is a point of honor for him not to be one of what he calls the "kiss-and-tell" boys, Phillips' public rhetoric so far has bordered on the mundane, remaining murky with unbrayed secrets.

What emerged from a recent and less guarded interview about himself, however, was a rare, detailed glimpse of the strange life of a spy who is also a devoted family man: a life of petty deceptions, strange inconveniences, social isolation endured along with exotic experiences and typical fatherly pain and pride.

Phillips' decision to take an early retirement from "the cold" has drawn him at least partially out of that confused world and into a suburban landscape of dirty dishes and concerns over personal finances. His wife, Gina,

a school administrator during the academic year, took a summer job at the Beauvoir School summer camp.

"The most difficult part was suggesting to my wife that we give up a healthy chunk of income," Phillips said. "She hesitated about two minutes after I told her what I wanted to do, and then she said, 'Go ahead.' As a result, she's out working today."

Phillips had been making \$38,000 a year as a GS-18 in the spy agency, and his retirement salary will be around \$18,000. He said the family will be able to stay in the comfortable ranch-style home at 8224 Stone Trail Dr. in Bethesda and keep the 1964 Kharman Ghia and the 1970 Oldsmobile station wagon.

"But we will have to make a few changes," he said. "We haven't been out to dinner in two months, for instance."

Phillips said pointedly that "my lecture agent told me I'd probably make between \$5,000 and \$10,000 on the circuit next season, between September and April. But he said if I would make anti-CIA talks I'd be able to get \$50,000 to \$100,000."

Acknowledging the moral dilemma

posed by institutionalized secrecy and stealth in a free society, he said he had undertaken his crusade "out of frustration born of a belief that our country needs an intelligent service and a recognition that there are tough times ahead for any secret organization after Watergate."

A more personal—and possibly more compelling—motive for his actions ambushed Phillips on his own hearth. Over the years, he explained, like most clandestine agents, he has had a special talk with each of his children as they reached their teens, breaking the news that "Daddy is not with the State Department and he is not a businessman. He is an intelligence officer."

A spy.

"In the past this has been pleasant and exciting," Phillips said. But a few months ago, when he made the announcement to 15-year-old Debbie, the fifth of the seven children, Phillips explained, her response was: "But that's dirty."

Relaxing in his sun-dappled living room in an embroidered "guayabera" shirt of the sort that is handmade in Guatemala, ("this one is actually a drip-dry from a factory in Manhattan," he said), Phillips embodied all the elements of the popular conception of James Bond: lean, tall, tan and with a jutting chin. He, in fact, used to be a professional actor.

He had tried acting in New York before and after World War II, part of which he spent in German prison camps after his plane was shot down. After deciding that he was a "bad actor," Phillips went to Chile "to take advantage of the GI Bill and write a play."

Soon afterward, he bought a dying English language newspaper there, The South Pacific Mail, along with all its debts. All it lacked was its own printing press.

"The day I purchased the press, the chief of station (CIA) there called me," Phillips said. "The combination of a 'clearable' American with a printing press was too much for him to resist."

"I was to be a 'dangle.' Word was to be leaked out in Chile that I was chief of American intelligence there. Sure enough, a KGB agent soon began to cultivate me. I was at that time being paid \$50 a month for my services. When that Soviet showed up, it occurred to me I should be getting more." In 1955, Phillips became a full CIA staff officer.

His undercover assignments took him to Guatemala, Cuba, Lebanon, to Washington ("I was involved in the Washington end of the Bay of Pigs"), to Mexico City, the Dominican Republic, Rio de Janeiro and Brasilia in Brazil, and to Caracas, Venezuela.

In the summer of 1973, Phillips said,

he returned to Washington as chief of Latin American Operations, where he directed the agency's hotly criticized covert activities in Chile that preceded the overthrow and death of President Salvador Allende.

(Phillips said that, after he heard rumors of the planned coup some five months before it occurred, he sent cables ordering CIA agents to "cut off contacts with people who are planning coups," and that consequently there were no agents in the groups that carried out the coup.

Phillips was in that post when he retired. Through most of these twists and turns, he was married and raising a family. He and his first wife, "who had met me when I was a bad actor," had five children before their divorce in 1967.

"It's very tough in that respect," Phillips acknowledged. "It's the kind of life that shows on a marriage."

A year after the divorce, he met Gina, an energetic and spy-wise blonde, also divorced, who was then an employee of the National Conference of Catholic Charities. Her former husband was an agent, and the friends who introduced her to Phillips were agents.

They married and combined families—his four surviving children (one died in a car accident) plus her three—and were off to Brazil, where they soon added Todd. They moved four times in four years, uprooting all the children from schools. "There were often long periods of separation," Phillips said, "but she made all the basic moves with me."

"Of course it was difficult moving the kids around," Gina Phillips said. "And it's difficult for a wife to work at her job in a foreign country; you're there on a diplomatic passport and you need special papers. And I had to give a lot of teas and do all the things expected of a diplomat's wife."

"Actually, life in Latin America was great. The cover was life in the diplomatic service, so we had a maid, someone else was paying our rent, the kids went to local American schools. It was beautiful."

"Then one comes back to Washington and puts one's feet back on the ground."

One of the most difficult aspects for the family, the couple agreed, is endemic—the lack of visible status in the agent's life. "Oh, sometimes the kids will say something like, 'Why don't we get a Cadillac with the flags flying, like Mr. Smith? Daddy's as smart as him.'"

"Why isn't Daddy going any further?" I would just say I don't know.

Someday."

"When your buddy who thinks you're with the State Department says to you, 'Hey, you've been in the business 20 years. Aren't you ever going to be chief of mission?' you just bite your lip," Phillips said.

Sometimes, the cover has led Phillips to antic extremes. "A fellow who lives down the street thought I worked at a government department downtown," he said. "He had this old clunker of a car that wouldn't start half the time. So he tended to come over and knock on my door in the morning and say, 'How about a lift, since our offices are right next to each other.'"

"Well, I'd drive 45 minutes through traffic all the way to the State Department and let him out, and then drive back to CIA headquarters, which is 15 minutes from my house. I did that a dozen times."

"One day I finally just told him, I said, 'I've got some news for you...' He laughed and was surprised, and said he wouldn't bother me anymore."

Really close friends had usually known the nature of her husband's work, if not the substantive details, Gina Phillips said.

"After you get to a certain point in your career where you've been 'burned' (exposed) a number of times, it's foolish to try to fool people," Phillips said. "Especially in the last three years, many of my close friends have known."

Over the long haul, he said, his social life had been divided in two. "Say you want to have a dinner for six. You say, 'Yeah, but if we invite so-and-so we won't be able to talk about such-and-such.' Intelligence people just naturally congregate socially in order to talk more freely."

Phillips is, of course, aware that some skeptics figure his new career is simply an extension of the old one—that is, he is still a clandestine operative on the CIA payroll, sort of a covert, quasi-maverick PR arm.

"Here, I'm drawing on my experience as newsmen as well as an intelligence officer. There are many similarities between producing news for newspapers and intelligence for an intelligence service."

"And in either, it takes a while to decide if your source is credible. Over time, as what I say proves out, I hope to establish credibility."

In fact, Phillips thinks he might eventually go back to that other kind of intelligence gathering. He thinks he might like to run a small newspaper, in the Catskills perhaps.

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FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM Meet the Press

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CITY Washington, D. C.

## FULL TEXT

LAWRENCE E. SPIVAK: This is Lawrence Spivak inviting you to "Meet the Press," with the head of the CIA.

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SPIVAK: Our guest today on "Meet the Press" is the Director of Central Intelligence, William E. Colby. Mr. Colby began his career as an intelligence officer with the OSS during World War II. He later joined the CIA where he held a number of major posts before becoming Director in September, 1973.

We'll have the first questions now from Ford Rowan of NBC News.

FORD ROWAN: Mr. Colby, in May of 1973, the Inspector-General of the CIA compiled a report which showed illegal and improper activities on the part of the CIA. You did not at that time inform the White House or the Department of Justice. Instead, you began the destruction of records, including several collections of names which were part of the domestic surveillance program.

My first question is, on behalf of the agency, were you attempting to obstruct justice?

WILLIAM E. COLBY: No, Mr. Rowan, I was not. I was attempting to change the procedures of the agency, to make sure that they complied with the law in the future and to eliminate any holdings we had that we should not have had.

ROWAN: Why was the White House not informed?

COLBY: I think there was just a misunderstanding as to why that wasn't done. We did inform the then chairman, acting chairman of our oversight committees in the Congress. We then issued a series

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of directives very specifically instructing our people how to conduct their affairs in the future so that there would be no further violation of law. And in that situation, I thought it best to let the misdeeds of the past sit quietly. I did not see that there was anything serious enough in there to warrant prosecution against any individual.

ROWAN: You mention informing members of Congress. Did they take any substantive action or did they let the matter just lie?

COLBY: At least one of them asked a lot of additional questions and sought further assurances that no further action would be taken.

ROWAN: Mr. Colby, you indicated that on your own, you decided that there should be no prosecution. Under which authority did you act?

COLBY: I did not see enough that warranted to me a request to the Department of Justice to prosecute. The question never came up in a direct form.

SPIVAK: Thank you, Mr. Colby. We'll be back to introduce our other panel members and continue the questions in just a minute. But first, this message from our alternate sponsor.

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SPIVAK: We're ready now to resume our interview on "Meet the Press." Our guest is William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence. You've just met Ford Rowan of NBC News. The other questioners on our panel today are James J. Kilpatrick of the Washington Star syndicate; Leslie H. Gelb of the New York Times; and Thomas B. Ross of the Chicago Sun Times.

We'll continue the questions now with Mr. Kilpatrick.

JAMES J. KILPATRICK: Mr. Colby, under the 1949 act, the CIA is exempt from the usual accounting procedures that apply to the budget and personnel of every other agency of the government. Is there really any point in maintaining such absolute secrecy over public funds being spent by your agency?

COLBY: Mr. Kilpatrick, early in the history of CIA, we exposed about half of our budget to GAO audit. Later on, the GAO determined that it felt that it could not conduct an adequate audit of half of it if they did not know the whole. There are certain things, of course, in our clandestine activity that must be kept from public exposure and even the risk of public exposure.

KILPATRICK: Mr. Colby, I can understand why the details of your budget might well be kept secret. But why is it necessary to conceal from the American people whether you're spending one billion, two billion, five billion, or whatever the sum is?

COLBY: Mr. Kilpatrick, in 1947, the weapons expenditures of the Atomic Energy Commission consisted of a one line item. Last year they consisted of fifteen pages of detailed explanation. I think it is inevitable that if you expose the single figure you will immediately get a debate as to what it includes, what it does not include, why did it go up, why did it go down, and you will very shortly get into a description of the details of our activities.

KILPATRICK: It's a political reason, is it not, sir, that

your budget would be especially vulnerable to being cut by members of the Congress who oppose the agency?

COLBY: Oh, I don't think so. I think the responsible members of the Congress would support a good intelligence service and a good intelligence program. And I think we have the best in the world.

SPIVAK: Mr. Gelb.

LESLIE GELB: Mr. Colby, would the 1947 act that established the CIA prohibit the CIA from collecting intelligence or providing support to collect intelligence within the United States on domestic individuals or groups?

COLBY: Yes. The act says clearly that the agency will have no subpoena, police, law enforcement powers or internal security functions. Now that does not mean that the agency can do nothing in the United States. It can do certain things related to foreign intelligence within the United States.

GELB: Well, when you appeared before various congressional committees....

COLBY: Many.

GELB: ...in the -- in the -- "many" is right -- in the wake of the disclosures about CIA collection of ten thousand or more dossiers, of bugging and surveillance and whatnot, you did not refer to these activities as illegal. In fact, you said they were not illegal; they were merely missteps. How do you reconcile that congressional testimony with what you just said now?

COLBY: I have said that they were wrong. I think "wrong" is a word that covers those few missteps and misdeeds that CIA has conducted over twenty-eight years....

GELB: Does "wrong" mean "illegal?" Does "wrong" mean "illegal?"

COLBY: Sometimes it does. Sometimes it merely means that we were outside our charter, although there's nothing otherwise illegal about the activity.

GELB: Does outside the charter mean that it was illegal?

COLBY: It means that it is wrong for CIA to do it....

GELB: Well, was it illegal....

COLBY: It was not necessarily a crime that it be done, but it was wrong for CIA to do it.

GELB: Was it illegal for the CIA to develop and collect these ten thousand and more dossiers?

COLBY: It was not illegal to collect them all. The allegation against CIA was that it conducted a massive, illegal domestic operation during the Nixon administration. The operation began in the Johnson administration. It was not massive. As you will note on page 149 of the Rockefeller Commission Report, it referred to three agents who were wrongly used. There was a collection of paper also collected, mainly FBI reports and newspaper clippings.

It was improper to collect some of these things. But I think that the word "wrong" covers both the actions which technically may have been illegal and the things that we had no right to

do.

GELB: But the Rockefeller Commission itself labeled most of these activities as unlawful. That's their word.

COLBY: A number of our activities were unlawful in the past. There were a few. But not -- this particular program, I think, was not labeled as unlawful.

SPIVAK: Mr. Ross.

THOMAS B. ROSS: Mr. Colby, the Murphy Commission on Foreign Policy has just come out with a report saying the Forty Committee in the White House, which is supposed to supervise the CIA activities has been meeting only infrequently and informally. Douglas Dillon, who was a member of the Rockefeller Commission, said there had never been any real oversight of the CIA.

How, then, could a series of Presidents and a series of Directors of the Central Intelligence Agency tell the American people that the CIA was under tight control?

COLBY: Well, I think I'll let the Presidents speak for themselves.

The reason the Forty Committee has not met very often is that because during the fifties and sixties the CIA was engaged in many activities abroad of a political and paramilitary character. In the last few years, that activity has dwindled to almost nothing. We do very little of that work today abroad. And therefore, there is much less occasion for the Forty Committee to meet and discuss those activities.

ROSS: When you say "little," what do you mean by little? How many covert operations is the Agency conducting around the world right now?

COLBY: Well, I really cannot give you specifics or the figures. But I say it is a very small percentage of our total budget at the moment.

ROSS: Reverting to the control issue, John McCone said that while he was Director of the CIA, he didn't know that planning was going forward to assassinate Castro. You have said that you didn't know about many things going on in the CIA, including the fact that the Justice Department gave you the authority to control your own lawbreakers.

Doesn't that indicate once again that the CIA was out of control of even its own Directors?

COLBY: No, I don't think so. In any large organization -- and CIA is a large organization -- with activities all around the world, every detail will not necessarily be known. I learned of the arrangement with the Rockefeller Commission when I was apprized of a problem which might involve that. And it looked that it was not supportable to me, and so I discussed it with the Acting Attorney General, who withdrew that arrangement.

SPIVAK: Mr. Colby, as one who knows the CIA from long association with it and who, I assume, is dedicated to the security of this nation, will you give us your appraisal of whether the investigations have, on the whole, been good or bad for the country?

COLBY: Well, I think there're both goods and bads, Mr. Spivak. I think that the good is that we are in the process of updating the old image of intelligence that is carried by many Americans to the new reality of intelligence; that intelligence

today is more than the old spy story or the TV spectacular on Saturday night. It now consists of an intellectual process of putting bits and pieces together, analyzing them, of collecting information from open sources wherever we can get them around the world, from technical capabilities, of which we, as Americans, have developed perhaps the most impressive collection in the world; and also some clandestine activity, of course, against those closed societies that can pose a threat to our country.

On the bad side I think are the sensational and irresponsible leaks and discussions that go on so that the characterization of our intelligence apparatus still does suffer that old image. I am interested really in trying to focus on the seventies and eighties and forget about the fifties and sixties. But I'm having a hard time doing it.

SPIVAK: Mr. Colby, earlier this year you were reported as saying that exaggerated charges of improper conduct of the CIA had placed -- and these were your words -- "placed American intelligence in danger."

What do you consider the most exaggerated charges that have been made against the CIA?

COLBY: The massive, illegal domestic operation, and I think some other charges have been made which are totally out of context in the total picture. I think here we have a difficulty that is perhaps a difference of profession between the journalistic profession and the intelligence profession. We try to put the jigsaw pieces together to draw from them the whole picture and present the whole thing in proportion. I think the journalistic profession, because of the nature of its media, is inclined to focus on the individual jigsaw piece and to bring that as typical of the whole. And that has given me a great deal of difficulty.

SPIVAK: Now the charges that have been made against the CIA and the investigations themselves have really raised so many doubts in the minds of the American people, and many people believe that the organization ought to be abolished altogether and that if a new one is needed, why, a new one should be started. What's your reaction to that?

COLBY: Well, I think the CIA today -- as I said, it may have done some things in the past which were either mistakes or wrong. But the CIA today is the best intelligence service in the world. It has the most dedicated and talented group of people working for it of any intelligence service in the world. It's the envy of the foreign nations.

I think that any attempt to disband it would leave our nation vulnerable. In a world in which we now sit thirty minutes away from a nuclear missile aimed and cocked at us, in a world in which our economic resources can be throttled by hostile foreign nations, in a world in which nuclear proliferation can pose a danger to all of us, I think we need good intelligence. I think we've got it, and I think we should continue.

SPIVAK: Mr. Rowan.

ROWAN: Mr. Colby, I'd like to ask you something about not the CIA, which you administer; but in your role as Director of Central Intelligence, you oversee the entire intelligence community. And I would like to ask you if the National Security Agency regularly monitors telephone calls between foreign -- between American citizens and citizens in foreign countries?

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COLBY: I think the National Security Agency's activities

are known to include the following of foreign communications. I think that's all I would like to say about that.

ROWAN: What I'm trying to get at is to find out if in the course of their activities involving foreigners massive records are kept on the number of calls, the places calls are made to from this country by American citizens.

COLBY: I would defer to the Department of Defense for the answer to that.

SPIVAK: Mr. Kilpatrick.

KILPATRICK: But pursuing that for just a moment, sir, the Rockefeller Commission talked about communist intelligence efforts within the United States and said that the Soviet Union, we gather, is making extraordinary use of electronic technology, is monitoring and recording thousands of private telephone conversations within the United States.

Could you amplify that, sir?

COLBY: Well, the Soviet Union does have a very extensive communications intelligence effort around the world. You've seen their trawlers off our coasts. They follow our fleets when they move. They have an extensive effort of that kind....

KILPATRICK: Are they monitoring domestic telephone conversations, to your knowledge?

COLBY: There are an awful lot of antennae on top of the Soviet Embassy. And I think they are there for a purpose.

KILPATRICK: Your estimate was five hundred thousand intelligence operatives in the communist bloc nations. That was the estimate of the Rockefeller Commission. Is that your estimate also, sir?

COLBY: I think that's a close figure.

SPIVAK: Mr. Gelb.

GELB: Mr. Colby, the Rockefeller Commission seems to describe the Chaos operation of the CIA, the collection of the files and the bugging, surveillance, so forth, as large, illegal and domestic. Let me quote from their report. They said "The CIA exceeded its statutory authority in these operations." It said the operations were "a repository for large quantities of information on domestic activities of Americans." It talked about "the large number of activities and the veritable mountain of material."

Wouldn't this substantiate a charge of massive, illegal domestic operations?

COLBY: I don't think so. I think that the word "illegal" obviously does apply to certain of the activities. But as I indicated, the Rockefeller Commission found three agents whose work was illegal. I don't think that's massively illegal. Those three agents were improper. There's no question about it.

With respect to the files, as the Commission found after looking at our files, most of the files consisted of FBI reports and clippings from the newspaper. Now we -- in my opinion, we should not have kept all those. But in the period of the time that this was going on, when you have a quarter of a million people demonstrating outside of the White House, when you had four thousand bombings occur in one year in this country, I think there was considerable concern as whether this was indigenous or was being stimulated and supported



by foreign intelligence or security services.

GELB: But your own study showed that these were not connected with foreign intelligence activities. And....

COLBY: And by studying it we found out that they were not connected. If we had not studied it, we could not make that finding.

GELB: But you can make that argument by saying you'd have to keep studying something forever to insure that it didn't have a foreign connection.

COLBY: No, I don't think you do. You respond to a present need, a present problem, a present danger. We terminated this operation a year and a half ago because the problem has gone away in great part. And consequently, there is not a reason for continuing that -- that kind of an effort to identify foreign links to American dissident organizations.

SPIVAK: Mr. Ross.

ROSS: Mr. Colby, Senator Church says that his intelligence committee has not been able to find evidence of an order from any President to the CIA to plan assassinations. Does that mean that the CIA was acting on its own in this area?

COLBY: Mr. Ross, I don't believe that I want to talk about the subject of assassinations. This is a very difficult and complex subject. Some of the facts are not well known or are not well recorded, and some of the degree to which various people within and outside of the Agency were a part of any such activity is not very clear. We have reported on this fully to the committees, and we will do so. But I do not think it appropriate for public discussion.

ROSS: Well, let me turn to another area then. The CIA placed the Shah of Iran back on his throne in the mid fifties. The Shah is now one of the principal reasons why we're paying a great deal more money for our oil.

In this instance as in others, mightn't it have been better to just allow events to take their normal course?

COLBY: And to allow the Communist Party of Iran to take over that country? I doubt that. I think you would have been stopped from the oil long before this.

ROSS: Would not -- would not oil possibly be cheaper in being bought from the communist countries? After all, we have engaged in some sort of an attempt to negotiate for natural gas from the Soviet Union. Mightn't that be a cheaper price than we're paying out of -- out of the Persian Gulf right now?

COLBY: In the mid fifties, the problem of communist expansion was a very great danger around the world. And we did a lot of things to prevent it.

In the seventies, we have begun a process of negotiation with a communist world which is itself divided in the Sino-Soviet split. You have a totally different strategic situation that we are facing today from the one we faced in the fifties.

SPIVAK: Mr. Colby, the public has been deeply concerned by the stories of CIA involvement in plotting to assassinate foreign leaders. Don't you think it would be better to release the full and true story lest rumors and speculation make it seem a lot worse than it is? Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370006-1

COLBY: No, Mr. Spivak, the instructions in the Agency are quite clear, that the Agency will not engage in, support or stimulate or condone assassination at this time. Those instructions have been issued by the Agency for several years now....

SPIVAK: We're talking about the past, though. We're talking about....

COLBY: We are talking about -- I do not think it useful to our country to go into a great exposure of things that happened in the fifties and sixties. And I think that the subject had better -- best be settled by adopting a firm policy at this point not to do such activity and letting the past stay quiet.

SPIVAK: Well, may I take you to one thing that is happening now. Rumors are being spread that the CIA is somehow involved in attempts to get rid of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Can you categorically state that CIA....

COLBY: I categorically deny that.

SPIVAK: ...is not involved in any way in that?

COLBY: I categorically deny that.

SPIVAK: Mr. Rowan.

ROWAN: Mr. Colby, the Rockefeller Report said that one of the CIA's computer systems had information on three hundred thousand Americans in it. You have testified that the CIA maintains forty to fifty such record systems.

I'm wondering -- can you tell us how many Americans are in the CIA's computer files, or can you estimate that number?

COLBY: No, I can't, Mr. Rowan. We obviously have many, many Americans in our files -- applicants, people who had clearances, people who have reported to us, sources of what is going on abroad. We have large numbers of Americans in our files. There's a great overlap in them. And I am unable to come out with a total.

ROWAN: One quick follow-up question. Has the CIA computer system been used not just to keep files, but to do modeling and predicting to try to predict behavior of people?

COLBY: I do not believe so, no. I'm pretty sure that has not been used as a prediction. We obviously use computers a great deal in our business of analyzing material, storing it, retrieving it, and so forth. As to predictability of personal behavior, of human behavior, there have been some experiments I think in modeling to see whether patterns grow and whether similar behavior is followed in future times. But this is conducted under the strict rules applicable to this kind of research and development.

SPIVAK: We have less than two minutes. Mr. Kilpatrick.

KILPATRICK: Mr. Colby, the Murphy Commission has recommended that the CIA be re-named the Foreign Intelligence Agency. Would that help your public relations' problem?

COLBY: I think if you just changed the name, why, our friends of the press would quickly penetrate that as being sort of a cosmetic change and not a real one, although the word "foreign" I am all for. In my confirmation hearing, I suggested that you add the word "foreign" before the word "intelligence" wherever it appears in the act.

SPIVAK: Now, Mr. Gelb.

GELB: Mr. Colby, if you thought a member of the CIA was, say, leaking information to Mr. Spivak, would you be empowered under the law to surveil and wiretap and bug Mr. Spivak?

COLBY: No, absolutely not. And I would not be empowered under even the legislation I recommend to improve our secrecy. I would not be allowed to do anything with respect to an outsider. I would be allowed to follow within the agency the activities of one of our employees that I thought was in some way misbehaving. I have the same authority in that respect as the head of any governmental organization, like the Fish and Wildlife Service, to be responsible for his own employees and their behavior.

SPIVAK: Thirty seconds. Mr. Ross.

ROSS: Mr. Colby, the Rockefeller Commission suggested it might not be such a good idea to have a career man as the head of the CIA. Do you think that's a hint from the White House that you maybe ought to resign?

COLBY: Oh, I don't think that's a hint. I serve totally at the pleasure of the President, and he can turn his pleasure somewhere else any time he wishes. I will do my duty. As long as he thinks I'm useful, I will stay.

SPIVAK: I'm sorry to interrupt, but our time is almost up and we won't be able to get in another question and certainly not another answer.

Thank you, Mr. Colby, for being with us today on "Meet the Press."

COLBY: Thank you.

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# CIA

## *The Case for Intelligence*

MILES COPELAND

MY ARTICLE ABOUT the CIA (March 14) brought several letters which took issue more or less sensibly with my various points, but many more which didn't quarrel with the points so much as with the morality of my making them. Since my recent book about the CIA (*Without Cloak or Dagger*) came out I've grown used to hate mail, and I've come to accept the fact that there's a definite campaign against those who don't subscribe to Sy Hersh's view of the Agency. But I can't get used to the fact that there is a campaign against those who say there is a campaign. Maybe I should get off the air—or, at least, be more subtle.

I've just said this in reply to a letter from an old friend, a former CIA employee who now sells used cars, this being the only job he could get following the campaign of a "civil rights" organization which somehow regards the hiring of ex-Agency employees as a violation of civil rights, and whose members systematically telephone personnel departments of major corporations threatening exposure to those who "take on CIA agents." He had chided me for saying the Agency found the conclusion that there was a Soviet program of subversion in the U.S. "almost inescapable," and had thought I was doing the Agency a disservice by softening what I know of its findings.

I get his point. But look: I can't go around saying that the course of self-destruction on which we seem to be embarked is due to a gigantic KGB plot. Whether it is or isn't doesn't matter. There are some views which, right or wrong, we're expected to accept. Allende became president of Chile by means of free, democratic elections. The government of South Vietnam was corrupt; the government of North Vietnam is not. Angela Davis is beautiful. If you've got ideas to the contrary you shut up about them—if, that is, you want anyone to listen to what *else* you've got to say. You accept those notions against which it's useless to argue, then, from a starting point of at least pretended agreement on basics, you proceed to offer particulars.

The assumptions about the CIA around which minds have closed can't be taken on at one sitting. I happen to think the CIA is bumbling and inefficient, and incapable of the activities of which it has been accused, and I am certainly not trying to defend it. But even if I were I would do so only within narrow, carefully defined limits where I know I am on safe ground. Once an audience suspects you are trying to justify the Agency in a general way it tunes

*The paperback edition of Mr. Copeland's book on the CIA, Beyond Cloak and Dagger (Pinnacle Press), will be published in mid-August.*

out, and from then on you can't even make points that its worst enemies must recognize as valid.

With respect to the issue of Soviet-inspired subversion in the United States, all one can hope for is that some people will at least give thoughtful consideration to the Agency's point of view. They can reject it in the end if they wish, but they should at least hear it. There is, after all, this inescapable fact: what is happening in our country is precisely what the Soviets want to happen, and what they have long, and openly, had plans to bring about. Could there be a connection between the happening and the plans? I should think it appropriate for the nation's intelligence agency to seek an answer to this question—and, while it is at it, to inquire into the related fact that whenever it dares even to suggest that there *might* be a connection its members are attacked by the nation's leading newspapers for being unregenerate cold warriors.

It's probably too late for the Agency to say anything about anything. Until recently it was silent for old-fashioned reasons of national security. Now that notions of national security have given way to those of "the public's right to know," even when it means that our enemies must also know, the public "knows" the wrong things. Fallacies about the Soviets and our relations with them have gone unchallenged for too long; they are now dogma. Supposedly well-informed editorialists use such phrases as "back in the days

There is, after all, this inescapable fact: what is happening in our country is precisely what the Soviets want to happen

of the cold war" and speak of "detente" without thought of how the Soviets define it. Well, if the Agency can't properly speak up neither can I. But perhaps it would be of some value to NR readers were I to outline how the Agency *must*, in the light of its background, view the current "our side bad, other side good" frame of mind we have got ourselves into. Here goes.

To start with, let's go back to why we have a CIA in the first place. It was the fear of another Pearl Harbor. We all agreed that it was unthinkable for a great country like ours to be taken by surprise by *any* event which might endanger our security, however remote the possibility of its occurring might seem. The first mission of the newly created Central Intelligence Agency was to help ensure an "early warning" in the event of another Pearl Harbor, and to provide information that the military would need in responding to it. In the late Forties, a team of Pentagon, State Department, and CIA planners sat down to figure out every major threat to our national security that might conceivably arise, and to work out dependable plans which, when a threat actually arose, could be dusted off and implemented without need of a lot of scurrying, *ad hoc* revisions. By the early Fifties, the CIA's information had pointed to "developing situations" which could lead to World War III, and a "contingency plan" had been drawn up for each. It was agreed that 36 "situations" would be kept under continual review, and the plans periodically brought up to date in the light of changing world circumstances. The responsibility was assigned to a committee consisting of Defense and State Department and CIA experts.

AS THE YEARS went by, the committee deteriorated, mainly because the quality of its members dropped (planning for events which will probably never happen is not a job

eagerly sought by a bureaucracy's best brains), but also because changes in world circumstances made the contingencies less and less realistic. Moreover, the planning was weakened by compromises reflecting the conflict between military men and the politicians. The military thought in terms of "first strike capability" and of giving priority to those contingencies that involved Russia's behaving more or less as Hitler's Germany did; the politicians believed that Russia sought to win victories without fighting, that in Soviet planning the military was subordinate to political aggression, that, in general, "Soviet strategy is more jiu-jitsu than boxing," as a State Department representative put it. The gap between the two points of view so widened that the "Pearl Harbor Committee," as it had come to be known, foundered to a halt. The exercise, or what was left of it, was taken over by "game players" from the various agencies, who promptly designated the "developing situations" with the more fashionable label, "scenarios," installed a computer, and set about turning the nightly gaming sessions into occasions for testing new techniques for predicting political events, with emphasis on the techniques rather than on the events. (Some chap wrote a book about it, remember, called *The Game of Nations*.) By 1970, "The Game" existed as a formal affair only when specific gaming problems were farmed out to universities and research groups such as the Rand Corporation. Inside the intelligence community itself it had become only one technique among many used by analysts as they found themselves faced with a situation so puzzling that it wouldn't respond to ordinary methods of examination.

The gaming device snapped back into action in December 1971, as the result of an innocent-sounding query made by a British officer at a meeting of British and American military experts held in London. He had just heard one of his colleagues present an impressive briefing on the state of readiness of British armed forces; his question was, "Yes, but can we use them?" Whatever their quality in terms of fighting preparedness, military forces cannot move without a national infrastructure—trains, public utilities, ports, basic industries, communications facilities, etc., which remain in the hands of civilians until war actually breaks out—and the infrastructure can't operate except in the hands of a civilian population that *wants* it to operate. The officer wanted to know whether this was or was not the situation in the Britain of 1971. He went on to postulate a Soviet-American military confrontation under circumstances chosen by the Soviets to ensure maximum sympathy for themselves and maximum blame on the "capitalist and imperialist" Americans, and a British government too weak to deal with the wildcat strikes, riots, sabotage, and urban guerrilla warfare it would provoke should it attempt to "drag Britain into a capitalist imperialist war." So—"But can we use them?" A legitimate question for an army officer of a country whose military posture is based on an alliance with NATO and the United States—which, he politely suggested, might have doubts about its *own* infrastructure.

My reputation as a "game player" was enough to cause one or two old Agency friends who had been with me in the old days to seek my advice with respect to applying game techniques to the questions at hand—I mean those questions that the British colonel's query had brought to mind. The Agency was in a quandary about a great conflict between conclusions to which its information was taking it. On the one hand, it was in possession of intelligence which proved conclusively that the Soviets were backing terrorist movements all over the world, stimulating violence in student and labor movements, "orchestrating" (to use Lenin's word) the penetration and corruption of many respectable non-Communist political and social organizations, and, in general, using "detente" as a means of winning, rather than relaxing, the cold war. It also had proof that the Sino-Soviet split did not, as some other experts

of the intelligence community believed, diminish the effectiveness and danger of these Soviet-supported activities. Finally, there was indisputable proof that the Soviets ultimately aimed at nothing less than a "revolutionary mass movement" in the United States, and that Soviet-supported activities, both abroad and in the United States, hung together in a single, easily charted master scheme. That was one side of the story. At the same time, there was a mass of information, equally convincing, that there was nobody in Moscow—or Peking, Havana, or any other Communist capital—who was up to such a massive organizational feat. The KGB can hardly be said to be staffed with organizational geniuses—nor is any other group in the hierarchies of the Soviet Union or of any other Communist country.

NOR, FOR THAT matter, in the CIA or the U.S. Government. "Gaming it all out" seemed an ideal way to answer the question: how can there be a master plan without master planners? CIA experts, with appropriate assistance from Defense and State, would bone up on current Soviet operational philosophies, put themselves in the shoes of KGB and other Soviet government officials known to have responsibility for operations against American interests, and figure how they would go about it. Looking at the problem from the Soviets' own point of view—and taking into account Soviet strengths, shortcomings, and operational options as the Soviets themselves saw them—might show how the Communists can achieve such well-coordinated results with so little coordinating ability. It did. Moreover, once the "gaming out" exercise had established the scaffolding, it was easy to bring order to the masses of information which until then had been so confusing.

There are two premises upon which to start any examination of Soviet strategies since Stalin. The first is that in any direct confrontation between us and them, they, not we, will choose the scenario. They will choose one which suits their purposes, not ours. The second is that in indirect confrontations—in small wars, that is—their strategies will be built entirely on their "can win, can't lose" position. (For example, North Vietnam could fail again and again in its attacks on South Vietnam yet win in the end, while South Vietnam had to lose only once to be finished—and the same with the Arabs and Israel.) There was already enough agreement on these points, but a difference of opinion arose between the military and the politicians when it came to postulating more specific guidelines.

**The Soviets had been convinced by our politicians and writers, not theirs, that our society was "rotten to the core"**

The guidelines the Soviets presumably would follow were these:

- In the event military conflict appears inevitable, the Soviets will choose a scenario that fits our weaknesses, not their strengths.
- They will primarily attack those of our institutions that stand between them and our weaknesses.
- They will use our own facilities to attack us, rather than facilities directly controlled by them.

At first the military-minded game players argued that the Soviets were *in fact* giving primary attention to their own strengths, outrunning us not only in building their military capabilities at home but in giving military aid to Communist countries involved in small wars, and that, regardless of any information to the contrary, the Soviets could be presumed to have confidence in their military might, and to



base their plans on it. "Besides," a superpatriot from the Pentagon said, "we don't have any weaknesses." Intelligence indicating that the Soviets did *not* have confidence in their military strengths—or, rather, that they had an inordinate respect for ours—was very impressive.

But what won over the military minds was intelligence on how the Soviets sized up our political situation. The Soviets had been convinced by *our* politicians and writers, not theirs, that our society was "rotten to the core," and that the American people were so disillusioned with the "stooges of the military-industrial complex" who are our leaders that should these leaders try to drag the country into a "capitalist imperialist" war our soldiers would refuse to obey the orders of their officers, young men would burn their draft cards, labor unions would go on strike, students would riot, "the people" the world over would demonstrate in front of our embassies, and that would be the end of it. Wishful Communist thinking, perhaps, but that's what the Soviets did believe in 1971—and probably do now.

Having accepted this first proposition, even the most outright military minds among the game players found the next two easy—especially since events of the moment were bearing them out. For example, the U.S. Army's security officers in Germany had been arguing that in the event of, say, a sudden sweep of Warsaw Pact armies across northern Europe our own military forces could be grounded by fifth columnists among German civilian employees, who could be presumed to exist in a target of such priority importance to the KGB, and that investigations into the backgrounds of those employees were absolutely essential. No sooner had the investigations got under way than there was an outcry, *in our own country*, and they had to be stopped. The FBI promptly established that the leaks of information which provoked the outcry came from U.S. Government employees under the influence of Communist-front organizations. It can be said that the Soviets' assault—not on the U.S. forces themselves, and not even on the German civilian employees, but on the U.S. agency whose job it was to uncover whether or not there were potential subversives and saboteurs among the employees—accomplished as much as a military move to neutralize American forces in Germany. More, in fact, because there was no price to pay in public relations.

It was the means by which the Soviets can accomplish so little with so much, using *our* resources, that drew the attention of the game players. We had it from the Soviets themselves (one really should read Lenin, and not waste time on the almost irrelevant Marx) that the steps were *sedation, diversion, penetration, and activation*.

Sedation is the business of "lulling the enemy into a false sense of security," a standard military stratagem dating back to the Bible. Today, the Soviets sedate us by means of a two-pronged approach. First, they show enthusiasm for detente, cultural exchanges, summits, and all sorts of efforts to prove that "the Russians aren't such bad chaps after all," as a member of President Nixon's staff said upon returning from a visit to Moscow.

GIVEN THE mood of wishful thinking in America today, the first prong is almost enough. There is, however, the second: the carefully indirect smearing of influential and articulate Americans who persist in suspecting the sincerity of all this copacetic behavior, and the carefully indirect support of influential and articulate Americans who accept it. By means I'll come to in a minute, these two categories of people are turned into the villains and heroes, respectively, of the American scene according to *their* scenario. The first are cold warriors, McCarthyites, and fascists; the second are—well, any term will do so long as it implies wisdom, reasonableness, and love of freedom and does not even remotely suggest Communism. "Communist" is the epithet which Soviet-front organizations like to bait those

of the first category into using.

As we all know, calling anything "Communist" is very unfashionable in America these days, and the Soviets know very well that the way to discredit something in our society is not to make it appear evil but to make it appear unfashionable.

It is well to remember that the measure of Communist sedation is not the prominence of Communist sympathizers but the apathy of everybody else. Take the situation in Britain, for example. A minority of leftist extremists in the National Students Union has succeeded in electing four of its number to the four top positions. We should perhaps be alarmed at the fact that a minority can win out over a majority by being pushier, or simply by bothering to show up at elections. But what's *really* the indication of Communist sedation in Britain is the fact that the *whole country*, 100 per cent of its taxpayers—including Harold Wilson, Margaret Thatcher, Peregrine Worsthorne, Anthony Lejeune, and Malcolm Muggeridge—supplies that \$50,000 per year that the NSU budgets explicitly for sit-ins, "agitprop," and other forms of disruption, and there is no sign that it will stop.

Sedation does not *quite* go far enough, however. There is no way the Soviets can completely conceal the fact that they are pursuing the cold war as vigorously as ever, and that detente is but one of their strategies. Unfortunately for them, there are a few analysts in the CIA, the State Department, the Pentagon, and even the universities who have the patience to read such official Soviet ideological statements as Mr. V. N. Egorov's *Peaceful Coexistence and the Revolutionary Process*, and a few ordinary people in the world outside who read James Burnham and Brian Crozier, and who are out of reach of this second prong. This fact necessitates step two, diversion.

Diversion is simply a matter of exploiting the Americans' almost masochistic propensity for self-criticism and the phenomenon of social sensitivity known to propagandists as "the conscience of the affluent." We *love* to find fault with ourselves, while being tolerant of our enemies. Witness, for example, the attention our media gave to the My Lai massacres while they all but ignored the hundreds of worse massacres committed by the other side. Or the television coverage of the South Vietnamese fleeing from the invading North Vietnamese. The coverage played up not the inhumanity of the North Vietnamese in causing such suffering, but the bad behavior of the fleeing Southerners. It is as if in Hitler's day the media had refrained from mentioning the Nazis' extermination of the Jews and had instead concentrated on the way the Jews jostled one another as they were being led to the gas chambers.

Because of our "conscience of the affluent," the fact that our country has fewer faults than any Communist country in no way protects us from damaging propaganda, nor does the nonexistence of a specific fault disqualify it as a sub-

**A principle of sabotage, however, is that the greater the thrust of the target the less the force that is required to make it destroy itself**

ject. Organizations for "the protection of civil rights" can exist only in countries such as Britain and America where civil rights need little defending, while they are unheard of elsewhere. Organizations for "protecting the people from alien influences" abound in China and Russia where no "alien influence" would dare raise its head, and are not allowed in Britain where alien influences, including Americans such as myself, are on the verge of taking the place over.

And if our critics, in their agonies of conscience, want

some genuine faults to harp on they can always read *The Greening of America*, which points out such "abuses of power" as the right of airlines to provide their passengers with copies of *Business Week* and not of *The Nation* and the power of nurses in hospitals to wake up their charges for early breakfasts. As Lenin pointed out, *nothing* is too petty to serve diversionary purposes. Remember that the event that started the chain of events that brought the fall of Germany in 1918 was a mutiny in the German fleet over a cut in the soap ration, and the Russian Revolution was sparked by a dispute over whether Moscow typesetters were entitled to payment for punctuation marks.

Sedation, even when combined with diversion, does not quite add up to what Lenin called "inoculation," the creation of a state of mind in your adversaries that lets you prepare for their destruction right under their noses without their being aware of it. Optimum success is attained when those adversaries see nothing but good in those who would destroy them, and nothing but bad in those who call attention to the dangers. A principle of sabotage, however—any kind of sabotage, whether physical, moral, or intellectual—is that the greater the thrust of the target (as in the case of a huge locomotive racing along the track at a hundred miles per hour) the less the force that is required to make it destroy itself. According to Boris Ponomarev and other Soviet experts on the Western scene who have written learned papers on the "social demolition" they have in mind for us, it is the very fact of our strength, vitality, and momentum which makes us an easy target for their political jiu-jitsu. Thus, a degree of success in inoculation far short of the optimum will suffice. Our mere tolerance of Communist instruments will do, as will mere polite skepticism toward those who oppose them—e.g., calling people like James Burnham, Brian Crozier, and Eugene Methvin cold warriors instead of fascists. It's even preferable: the epithet "fascist" makes a target look merely evil while "cold warrior" makes him look ridiculous.

I'll save for a later article the discussion of how CIA analysts see the Soviets achieving penetration and activation, the final steps toward their ultimate objective, a "revolutionary mass movement" in the United States. Here, I want to concentrate on how Lenin's first two steps, sedation and diversion, are pushed to the point of achieving inoculation. This brings us to the "franchise system," which I talked about in my last article [*Is There a CIA in Your Future?* March 14] but which, judging by the mail that piece provoked, requires further elaboration.

**T**HE FRANCHISE system, as I said, is a means devised by the Soviets' new school of social demolitionists, who recognized the absurdity of Stalin's insistence that revolutionary movements throughout the world could and should be controlled from Moscow, and who recognized a need for a system which took into account the realities of today—namely, that resistance to authority and discipline is what a modern "revolution" is all about. Under the franchise system, they could make use not only of Communists but of "anti-anti-Communists" and everybody else who is their "enemy's enemy." By such a system, I said, they could achieve results in the manner of Colonel Sanders' Kentucky Fried Chicken, without the burdens of "control." I thought what I said was clear enough, but judging by the mail I got maybe I should have spelled it out. I do so now.

In the franchise system, as it applies to the United States, there are five layers:

1. Agents ("leakers") inside the U.S. Government who expose official secrets, not to the Soviets' espionage organization, the KGB, but to our own congressmen and journalists who can be counted upon to reveal them to the public.

2. A combination of "front" organizations, non-Communist and having no known connection with the Soviets, which cultivates the leakers of secrets and protects them

from trouble, and which systematically encourages the congressmen and journalists to make the most effective use of the information.

3. "Termites": congressmen and journalists, "anti-anti-Communists" or whatever, who seek to discredit exactly those institutions, organizations, and persons the Soviets, for separate reasons, wish to discredit.

4. "Maggots": ordinary journalists, writers, and other influencers of public opinion who have no strong views one way or the other about the targets of the Soviets and the termites, but who know a bandwagon when they see one.

**The Soviets see "the kids" as our fashion setters; they and the parents who consciously or unconsciously court and imitate them are the audience**

5. "Subscribers": ordinary people—sometimes, I regret to say, including you and me—who have found that life goes more smoothly if they at least pay lip service to the myths, idols, and demons which the franchise system eventually builds up, or who simply feel that they can't spend their lives writing letters-to-the-editor and making nuisances of themselves by jumping up to say, "Hey, wait a minute!" every time they hear someone advancing a notion which damages the country.

How it all works is so simple that those who gamed it out—and who subsequently got plenty of reliable information to support their conclusions—wondered why they hadn't thought of it before. How can a small group of planners sitting in Moscow, with only limited intellectual and organizational resources, bring about a well-coordinated and highly effective program of "decomposition," as the KGB's "Section D" calls it, in a country whose economic and social advantages far exceed theirs, and do so through use of resources which are far above the planners' own efficiency and sophistication? The answer is in the relationships among elements of the five levels of the franchise system.

Let's start at the top, with the leakers. If you've read my book on the CIA, you may remember that I listed several standard types of espionage agents as they are described in Agency classrooms. There is the "Emily"—the spy employed in a target government office who is spotted, indoctrinated, and recruited by a "principal" of a foreign intelligence service using conventional methods; the "Mickey"—the spy who takes the initiative in offering his services to a foreign intelligence service; the "Philby"—the long term spy, recruited in his youth, who may have taken years to work himself into a prominent position within the target; the "Willie"—the spy who is actually working for one intelligence service while he thinks he is working for another or for no intelligence service at all but for some business firm trying to gain the inside track on lucrative government contracts or for some crusading congressman or newspaper columnist. Then, in my last piece, I described what we may now call the "Philip": the leaker who sympathizes with our enemies and wishes to get information to them, but has discovered that he can do so *legally*—and incidentally, profitably—by writing it up in a book which our enemies, along with thousands of other people, can buy in any bookstore. The agents and quasi-agents on the top rung of the franchise ladder are either "Philips" or "Willies" or a combination of the two, or not quite either. In that case, their function is much broader than any other type of agent.

The "Willie," remember, may be working for the KGB while he thinks he is working for some less anti-American organization, say the CIA itself. The "Willie" of the franchise system may knowingly or unknowingly be working for the KGB or a Communist-front organization and *pretend* he is working for the CIA, as was the case of at least one of

those "former undercover CIA agents" who furnished *New York Times* reporter Seymour Hersh information—or "disinformation"—on the CIA's alleged "domestic break-ins and wire-tappings while monitoring radicals in New York City" [*New York Times*, January 19]. Needless to say, there are bona fide employees of the CIA and other U.S. Government agencies who aren't any kind of agent, and who have simply been caught up in the latest fashion. Those of the Soviets' franchise system are easily distinguished from these, however, because the franchise member's information invariably takes the form of pieces of jigsaw puzzles which, when put together, form completed pictures of the sort the KGB's decompositionists seek to get across. Given the journalist's natural preference for stories that "add up," it is not remarkable that leads and information leaked to them as the result of KGB inspiration are the ones they most eagerly seize upon.

What is remarkable is the extent to which the termites who seize upon the stories have been inoculated: they refuse to listen to dissenting information, or to any suggestion that they've been taken in, and they attack anyone who dares to dispute them. (Look at the trouble I've had, for example, for disproving the story about Henry Kissinger's making that statement, "If the Chileans are so irresponsible as to elect a Communist . . .") It is the new, post-Stalin type of front organization that has made this possible.

For years, the FBI in our own country and the CIA abroad directed their efforts toward sniffing out Communist-controlled front organizations, while they should have remembered that Lenin had advised his followers to concentrate on "mass organizations built around specific issues" which were already in existence. To paraphrase Eugene Methvin (whose book *The Riot Makers*, incidentally, is indispensable reading for anyone seeking a detailed, yet compulsively readable, account of the Soviets' decomposition tactics in the U.S.), agents whose connection with the Communists is completely secret first locate themselves in primary schools (and their Parent-Teacher Associations), the media, churches, labor unions, and charitable organizations, and then stimulate them to action in aid of causes which are not identifiable as uniquely Communist but are "protest" issues which any public-spirited citizen can get behind. The issues of civil liberties and peace are ideal because they present no real problems, and allow complete range to the decompositionists to fabricate ones which suit their purposes. Eugene Methvin exposed numerous cases where Communist agents among rioters used "guerrilla theater" techniques to fake photogenic instances of "police brutality"; the FBI and the CIA have similarly uncovered dozens of cases where Communist agents faked cases of "invasion of privacy" or "repression of freedom of speech" in order to provoke outraged reactions from civil liberties organizations. Once the reactions are under way, they are left to the well-intentioned but naïve non-Communists in the organizations. The Communists themselves step back into the shadows.

**W**ITHOUT the majority of their members realizing it, the function of the front organizations is to provide a link tying the leakers to the termites, while at the same time serving as a lead wall separating the Soviets from the franchise system. They serve the leakers by giving them such legal assistance as they may require to protect them from charges of espionage by government agencies which haven't yet learned the futility of such charges, and by providing whatever publicity, lobbying, and behind-the-scenes influence they may require to hold onto their jobs, to find new ones, or merely to enjoy the delights of martyrdom. They encourage the termites by giving them inside tracks on the news stories they generate, by publicly idolizing them, and by otherwise appealing to their vanity. Vanity, when you get right down to it, is what the termites are all about.

Lenin's main category of termites was what he called "useful idiots"—compulsive anti-authority liberals, nondescript leftist extremists who call themselves Marxists without ever having read Marx, and other varieties of individuals and groups who are against the existing order simply because it is the existing order. They were useful in Lenin's day because they were immediately available; they are useful today for the same reason, and because they fit nicely into various facilities of marginal value such as the underground press. For those franchise purposes which concern the CIA, however, the Soviets use "intellectuals"—a word that has no meaning except when enclosed in quotes, and that denotes all persons in professions where there is freedom to point out the problems of society and to prescribe solutions for them but no accountability for results. A doctor may be cheered for announcing, "I am against disease in all its forms!" or for advocating a public health program, but he can't make a career that way. His success rests on whether or not he cures sickness—just as a lawyer's rests on the cases he wins, an engineer's on how well the bridges he builds stand up, and an aircraft designer's on how well his airplanes fly.

Contrast these professions with journalism, education, the church, and the arts. "Intellectuals" actually *thrive* on pointing out insoluble problems, and nobody holds against them even their most lunatic solutions since they never get tested and are therefore never proven wrong. Moreover, unlike doctors, engineers, and others in practical pursuits, they know how to state their arguments clearly and convincingly.

I'm afraid I've sneaked in my own private explanation of why it is that the problem solvers of a society move to the right politically while the problem finders move to the left, and why the problem finders who can't command high pay (the "ignorant intellectuals," we residents of Britain call them) wind up teaching Marxism in schools, while the ones who can, wind up writing newspaper columns and presiding over TV talk shows. I return to the Soviets, though, to point out that they apply this reasoning to "the kids"—who are, let us not forget, the prime target of the KGB's efforts at decomposition. And why? Well, they're useful for draft card burning exercises when there are major military confrontations, and for demonstrating us into weakened positions when there are minor ones, but these are not their only value. The Soviets see "the kids" as our *fashion setters*; they and the parents who consciously or unconsciously court and imitate them are the audience. Moreover, being long on perspicacity and short on practical experience, "the kids" are an ideal audience for the kind of people who become termites. They are utopians who can be counted on to applaud exactly the utopian views that termites went into politics and the media to express.

**T**HE "maggot" is a journalist—or a politician, film producer, or whatever, but usually a journalist—who does not have any utopian notions, but who shares the termite's need for applause. Or, if it's not a need for applause motivated by vanity, it's at least a practical realization that he must please his readers and his editors if he is to hold onto his job.

As good an example as I can think of is a British television crew I ran into in South Africa. Mind you, I hold no brief for the Afrikaners and their apartheid, but I must say that when I was in South Africa, equipped with some thirty years of investigative experience, I was unable to find any of the horrors that the crew featured in the film it made—little boys scavenging in garbage cans, women carrying back-breaking loads, both men and women clawing at the outside world through barbed wire. I asked one of the crew how he had managed to find such scenes to photograph, and he explained that he had put coins in the garbage cans, paid the women to load themselves down with sacks stuffed with old newspapers, and posed the men and women outside the barbed wire enclosure (he couldn't induce them

to go in), while the camera crew crawled into the enclosure to take photographs of the curious natives who were drawn to peep through the fences to see what such a weirdly dressed lot of white folks might be up to. Why? Because the producer of the film hated Afrikaners and wanted to show them as being worse than they really were? Not a bit of it. He *liked* them. All he wanted was a good man-bites-dog film which fitted the mood of the viewing public. Were he to send his London headquarters a film showing "South Africa Good," as he put it, his equally nonpolitical, non-utopian boss would think he had lost his mind and wouldn't show the film. So, South Africa Bad. And Bad it will remain, whatever the Afrikaners do about their apartheid, so long as that's what the maggots have to report to stay in business.

Once the Soviets have "maggots" in the act, they've won the game. Anyone who argues inside a maggot-oriented framework can rely on assumptions. Anyone who challenges the framework must start from scratch, and has an uphill job all the way. "In view of the CIA's involvement in Watergate," asks a member of a student audience I talked to a few months ago, "don't you think that the U.S. Government should . . . ?" and so on and so on. If I start my

Folks think the government would be negligent in its duty if it didn't have somebody keep an eye on the likes of Mrs. Abzug

reply by saying, "Now, wait a minute, it happens that the CIA was *not* involved in Watergate," the audience breaks into raucous laughter, and before I can even approach the question itself I've got the tiresome, thankless job of neutralizing a premise which is so thoroughly accepted that, for all practical purposes, it's a matter of what lawyers call "judicial notice." My inclination is to say to hell with it, then answer the question with as few words as possible, and resolve not to talk to any more college audiences.

This brings me to the "subscriber." I want you to go back and read the second sentence of the paragraph just ahead of the one above, the sentence which begins, "Mind you, I hold no brief for the Afrikaners and their apartheid." That's what I mean by subscribing. I opened my sentence in that way so as to establish the fact that I'm not just some racist who is biased in favor of the Afrikaners, to obviate the necessity of getting sidetracked into a lengthy discourse on a subject which has nothing to do with the point I'm trying to make, and to present that point as having come from someone who is objective. Simple declarative statements are subject to refutation, or to the suggestion of bias on the part of those who make them, but assumptions tend to slip past our critical filters.

We're all, I'm afraid, to some degree "subscribers." This being the case, and considering the subscription rates, the emotional and "intellectual" environment of the United States is *already* one which favors the enemy's objectives more than our own.

You will not be surprised to learn that many people out in Langley believe that their Director, William Colby, has been doing too much "subscribing" of late—especially when he put on that obsequious performance (assuming *Newsweek's* description of it was correct) before the onomatopoeic Mrs. Abzug. Many of them come from parts of Middle America where folks think the government would be negligent in its duty if it didn't have *somebody* keep an eye on the likes of Mrs. Abzug, and couldn't care less if it's the FBI, the CIA, or the Fish and Wildlife Division of the Department of the Interior. My personal view, shared by people at the Agency with whom I've managed to discuss the subject, is that all that is owed to Mrs. Abzug by the director of an agency which keeps files on you, me, Elvis Presley, Bob Hope, B. **Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370006-1**

ernor Wallace, and all but two or three members of Vice President Rockefeller's blue ribbon commission including Mr. Rockefeller himself, is a shrug of the shoulders and a remark to the effect that she's in good company. As one of my Agency friends said, "If we don't keep files on people who take it upon themselves to make contact with North Vietnamese officials, then whom *do* we keep files on?"

I don't know Bill Colby (and neither, remarkably, do a lot of fairly high-ranking Agency members), so I—we—may be doing him an injustice. All the same, I would be happier were he to stand up to his critics and instead of "admitting" that the Agency has done this or that, simply say that it has, and explain why. Is it necessary that he apologize for training Tibetans to stand up to the Chinese Communists who are occupying their country? Or for the CIA's having given advice to local police forces that have problems of terrorism—for the reason that "it is exceeding its charter"? (The story that he "admitted" that the Agency had "furnished information to the White House" and promised not to do it again is no doubt apocryphal, but the fact that it is circulating among Agency personnel is an indication of prevalent feelings.) What is needed is not a series of articles in *NR*, but a once-and-for-all, shoot-the-works official paper on the present state of security in our country, what caused it to be in that state, and what has to be done to build up its strengths and to remedy its weaknesses—including whatever legislation it takes to shut up the leakers.

But that leaves the termites and the maggots, and neither I nor anyone I know who agrees with the sentiments I express here believes that *anything* should be done about them, certainly not censorship of the press, not even the mild kind they have in Britain. I don't even object to their refusal to substantiate their stories or to reveal their sources—so long, that is, as they allow their country's secret intelligence agency the same privileges, and don't recoil in horror every time a CIA Director "withholds information." We can only rely on the probability that somewhere along the line our friends in the media will get wise to themselves. Let's face it, our press has been corrupted. It is axiomatic that in the course of winning a bloody struggle the victor unconsciously absorbs some of the worst characteristics of the vanquished, even those he so deplored as to be drawn into the struggle in the first place. We've seen this happen to our armies in all our wars, from the American Revolution to Vietnam. I submit that the campaign against the Nixon Administration over Watergate has, in the end, caused much of the press to adopt the very attitudes and practices that the crusade was to expose, and that "at this point in time" those reporters who are conducting the witch-hunt against the CIA have more in common with Gordon Liddy than they have with Woodward and Bernstein.

**B**UT THAT'S not all. Some of those reporters have by now become *committed* termites: to an extent they could not possibly realize, they have become so thoroughly committed to an assault on our institutions, and on those of us who dare to defend them, that they continue to hawk stories that suit their purposes, and to persist in defending them, long after they've been disproved—such as, for example, the story about Kissinger's alleged remark about the "irresponsible Chileans," which even the most naïve reporter on a high school paper should have recognized as absurd in the first place. You can rest assured that even should the congressional committees find the Agency 99 per cent perfect—the termites will blow up that remaining 1 per cent so big as to prove they were right about the Agency all along, and make headlines about its "admitting" that 1 per cent rather than about its proving the 99 per cent. Look at the way the *New York Times* handled the Rockefeller Commission report, as a case in point. It had an eight-column two-inch **Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP77-00432R000100370006-1**

'PLAINLY UNLAWFUL' ACTS/ THAT IMPROPERLY INVADED AMERICAN RIGHTS; and the first paragraph read: "The Central Intelligence Agency has conducted a vast network of unlawful or uncontrolled domestic operations that resulted in the creation of files on 300,000 individuals and organizations, mail openings, wiretappings, room bugging, burglaries, extensive 'monitoring' of overseas telephone calls, secret drug testing, and infiltration of American political groups, according to the report of the Rockefeller Commission released today." The only thing that wasn't in that opening paragraph (and was only paraphrased in the first page, incidentally) was the finding of the Commission, which was: "A detailed analysis of the facts has convinced

the Commission that the great majority of CIA's domestic activities comply with its statutory authority." To protect themselves ("to protect themselves from themselves," as my favorite Jesuit puts it) the termites have invented a morality which allows them to pull any dirty trick in the book as they take out after defenders of the institution, yet retain the illusion that they are acting on a basis of high moral principles.

What can be done about the subscribers? Again, nothing. We live in a country where everybody subscribes to whatever he likes. But the American people are far from stupid, and their gullibility has its limits.

Thursday, July 3, 1975 THE WASHINGTON POST

# CIA News Service Reported

By Bernard D. Nossiter  
Washington Post Foreign Service

LONDON—The Central Intelligence Agency secretly created a news service here, Forum World Features, to supply political and other articles to newspapers around the world, according to knowledgeable officials.

The agency quietly closed down the nine-year-old operation in April for at least two reasons, these officials said. First, they said, the CIA is withdrawing from covert propaganda activities of this kind. Second, the agency is said to have feared that Philip Agee or some other dissident ex-CIA officer would blow Forum World Features' cover.

When it began selling articles in 1966, the service's owner of record, according to the officials, was John Hay Whitney, former U.S. ambassador to Britain and chairman of the International Herald Tribune. Early in 1973, Whitney was replaced by Richard Mellon Scaife, who has held a variety of posts with the huge Mellon interests in oil and banking.

[In New York, Whitney's said he had "no comment on the subject" of CIA involvement in the news operation. A three-day effort to reach Scaife for comment was unsuccessful.]

Editors in London who bought articles from Forum World Features say that the service was highly professional. Its day-to-day operations were supervised by Brian Crozier, a well-known British writer of right-wing views. Crozier has denied that the news agency had any link with the CIA.

Crozier's clients recall only

rare attempts at what would seem to be propaganda, thus bolstering the service's credibility. The editors said that propaganda was apparent in articles dealing with Vietnam, where the service gave strong support to the official American position.

Ian Wright, foreign editor of The Guardian, recalled that one slanted story from Forum World Features did slip into the paper in the 1960s. It reported that Somalia had received 150 Mig-17 fighter bombers from the Soviet Union. Wright, who was not foreign editor at the time, said that a few weeks later the newspaper set the record straight with an account of Somalias 12 Migs.

The disclosure of Forum World Features' CIA parentage was first made in Time Out, a weekly that blends left-wing political commentary with an entertainment guide. The link has now been confirmed by knowledgeable officials.

Time Out also published what it now says was a copy of an internal CIA memorandum discussing the news service. Intelligence sources here have said that the text sounds authentic.

The memo is addressed to "DCI," probably former Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms, and appears from internal evidence, to have been written in 1968. As printed in Time Out, it says:

"Forum World Features Ltd. (FWF) is an international news feature service located in London and incorporated in Delaware whose overt aim is to provide on a commercial basis a comprehensive weekly service covering international

affairs, economics, science and medicine, book reviews and other subjects of a general nature. In its first two years, FWF has provided the United States with a significant means to counter Communist prop (sic) and has become a respected feature service well on the way to a position of prestige in the journalism world. Begun as a commercial entity in January, 1966, FWF was created from the residue of Forum Service an activity of the Cong. for Cultural Freedom (CCF) from which CIA withdrew its support in 1966."

Beneath the unsigned memo is written, in hand: "Run W. knowledge and cooperation of British intelligence."

The handwritten line reflects the ground rules under which CIA operates here. Officials say that the agency, which has a substantial staff at the embassy in London, largely performs a liaison function, sharing information with its British counterparts. Forum World Features was a special case, and in accord with the convention, could operate only with the blessing and knowledge of the British intelligence services.

Editor Crozier indignantly denied in a telephone interview that the news agency had any link with the CIA. He readily acknowledged that it was an offshoot of a CIA giveaway news service, but insisted that he had broken the tie to the agency.

Crozier said he became director of Forum World Features in 1965 when he was told that Whitney had bought it. Thereafter, he said, he struggled to break the remaining links to the CIA's Congress

for Cultural Freedom, and succeeded in 1966.

He said that it was possible that some of the free-lance journalists from whom he brought articles were in the pay of the CIA. When asked whether he knew there was CIA money or support for the service itself, he replied:

"Not to my knowledge." He then hung up.

Crozier also insisted that he had left Forum World Features in June 1974. However, documents here that were filed with the Department of Trade when the service closed down on April 29 list Crozier as the "person running the business."

His deputy, Ian Hamilton, also described the CIA link as "a whole fabrication of rubbish." Hamilton says that Scaife wound down the service because it was running at a loss.

Like Crozier, Hamilton suggested that he may have been duped by what he called "paid hacks" working for the CIA.

Undoubtedly, many of the free-lancers—and perhaps some of the editors—did not know about the CIA sponsorship.

In fact, Forum World Features was very careful about the writers from whom it took copy. One American free-lancer living in Britain sold several articles to the agency, but then was told it could buy no more. "You have a Jewish name," an editor explained, "and our clients in the Middle East would not like that byline."

A new home has been found by both editors: the Institute for the Study of Conflict.



Thursday, June 26, 1975

THE WASHINGTON POST

# CIA Is Linked to Funding Of European Unity Groups

By Bernard D. Nossiter  
Washington Post Foreign Service

LONDON, June 25—As far back as 25 years ago, the Central Intelligence Agency was secretly subsidizing private political organizations promoting European unity, according to a doctoral thesis written by the son of the secretary general of the European Movement, one of the groups said to have received funds.

According to the dissertation, written in 1962, the CIA, using a group of distinguished Americans and its own leaders as a cover, was pumping into the European Movement and its affiliates.

From 1947 until 1953, the European Movement and its offshoots are said to have spent an estimated \$2.8 million. Of this, the thesis says about \$1 million came from secret U.S. funds and another \$170,000 from American business firms. The Washington contribution was put at 38 per cent of the total.

It has been known for some years that the CIA secretly financed political and propaganda activities in Europe, such as Radio Free Europe, which broadcasts to Communist nations; youth and labor organizations, and even some publications, among them the British magazine Encounter. The European Movement, however, has not been mentioned among these.

A detailed account of the relationship is given in a 1962 doctoral thesis written at St. Antony's College, Oxford, by Francois Xavier Rebattet. He was in a unique position to search the records and interview those involved because his father, Georges, was deputy secretary general and later secretary general of the European Movement.

Rebattet's thesis, "The 'European Movement' 1945-1953: A Study in National and International Non-Governmental Organization Working for European Unity," was first brought to public attention by Time Out a lively London weekly.

Interviewed by telephone at his Paris apartment today, Georges Rebattet emphasized that the bulk of the CIA money went to finance the European Movement's youth arm and not his headquarters. He estimated the U.S. subsidy to his own secretariat at no more than \$10,000 to \$20,000 a year.

"We knew there were people of the CIA" on the American committee transmitting funds, he said, "but we were not so very interested."

Many of the European Movement leaders,

called, had fought in the wartime resistance and had met Allen Dulles, then in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and later CIA director. Rebattet said it then seemed natural to work with Dulles after the war.

Rebattet said that the Americans had not pressed any policy or program on the Europeans that the Europeans themselves rejected. "We were not under pressure from the American committee," he said.

He recalled that, in private talks, the Americans had urged the formation of a European Defense Community (EDC), a project to overcome French fears of a rearmament Germany by creating a Western European army. But here, too, according to Rebattet, the Americans acted with discretion. The project was ultimately defeated by the French Assembly.

The younger Rebattet's thesis underscores the heavy CIA influence in the American Committee on United Europe, the body that transmitted the funds across the Atlantic. Its chairman was William J. Donovan, the wartime boss of OSS, the CIA's predecessor. Allen Dulles was vice chairman; Thomas Braden, a CIA official and now a columnist, was executive director, and Charles M. Spofford, a New York lawyer identified in the thesis as a CIA man, was a director.

Braden, reached for comment in Washington, said his tenure with the committee was before he became a CIA officer and, as far as he knew, the funds raised in the United States were genuinely private contributions, not money from the CIA.

"So far as I know, there was no CIA money in it," Braden said.

What happened after I left, I don't know."

Another director was Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, head of the CIA from 1950 to 1953 when the U.S. funds began flowing in quantity to the private European pressure groups.

Prominent members of the American committee included David Dubinsky of the Ladies Garment Workers Union; Arthur Goldberg, then general counsel of the CIO; Conrad Hilton, the hotel tycoon, and Lucius Clay, former commander of U.S. forces in Germany. It was an elite group, dominated by corporation executives and bankers, and limited to 600 members.

Rebattet describes the money channelled through the committee to Europe as "State Department secret funds."

Rebattet does not disclose which members of the European Movement knew that secret U.S. funds were helping finance their activities. His father thinks that the movement's first chairman, Duncan Sandys, was aware of Washington's aid. Sandys, the son-in-law of Winston Churchill, was to become a minister in a Conservative government.

The thesis indicates that Paul-Henri Spaak, the second chairman, clearly knew. He insisted, however, that the U.S. funds pay only for special projects so that the movement would be protected from being labeled as an American tool. Spaak later became Belgium's prime minister.

Donovan, the American chairman is pictured as being remarkably blunt about the committee's aims, if not its methods. He is said to have insisted that Germany must be rearmament, something its neighbors would accept only if Eu-

rope was unified politically. Donovan's position was said to be that Europe must be united and strengthened to resist communism.

The Rebattet thesis makes clear that the biggest outlay of secret U.S. funds went to finance the European Youth Campaign. Between 1951 and 1959, this outfit got \$3.8 million in hidden subsidies.

Rebattet said this group was heavily supported because John J. McCloy, then the U.S. high commissioner in Germany, was impressed by a 1951 Communist youth rally that drew 2 million to East Berlin. McCloy wanted the west to match it, but the Europeans successfully resisted staging what was said to be such a crude propaganda exercise.

They got their money anyway, and Rebattet gives this breakdown of activities that the funds financed in 1952: 1,889 study sessions or congresses; 90 film showings; 1,743,149 brochures in 10 languages; 21 exhibitions; and printing of 2,765,650 periodicals.

Rebattet says the American committee pushed its scheme for a European army through an action committee for the supranational European Community. He reports that it got all its money from the United States, but only part from government funds. In a six-month period ending on May 31, 1953, the action committee took in \$77,000.

As for Rebattet, Francois Xavier is now 38 and a freelance interpreter. He received his doctorate for the thesis. His father, Georges, now 67, is a consultant to a private welfare agency aiding immigrant workers in France.

WASHINGTON POST  
3 July 1975

## Other Voices . . .

### The CIA Under Fire

There are two main dangers to be averted. One is that the agency can be missed by an unscrupulous administration. The other is that it can get out of anyone's control . . . Both these things have happened.

—The Times, London (independent)

That CIA members have been discussing the assassination of political leaders of countries with which the U.S. was not even at war . . . is a demonstration of political weakness, not power. . . . An autonomous CIA

is unthinkable. . . . Checks and balances need to be applied to intelligence operations . . . as to other workings of government.

—The Guardian, Manchester (liberal)

Only a few of the 30,000 CIA people are affected by the charges while there are 400,000 secret Soviet agents, who have left their bloody traces on history. . . . Intelligence services have nothing in common with the Salvation Army.

—Bonner Rundschau, Bonn (conservative)

The CIA is an essential weapon for the protection of the U.S. and the West. . . . While statesmen exchange smiles and handshakes, intelligence



services wage a silent war. . . . The most powerful and least scrupulous secret police of all time, the Soviet KGB, is immune from criticism by its government.

—Tagesspiegel, West Berlin (independent).

leaders really intend to clear out the jungle growth of the CIA. . . . But this is what must be done if U.S. relations with the rest of the world are to be healthy.

—Politiken, Copenhagen (liberal).

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A tough fight lies ahead if U.S.

The Washington Star

Wednesday, June 25, 1975

# CIA Spied on Candidate

By Norman Kempster  
Washington Star Staff Writer

CIA Director William Colby revealed today a CIA agent participated in a congressional campaign without the knowledge of the candidate and filed reports on campaign activities to the CIA's "Operation Chaos" campaign against domestic anti-war groups.

In testimony to a House subcommittee Colby conceded the activity was not proper and he pledged, "it will not occur again."

Colby refused to identify the congressional candidate or the agent. But he said the candidate did not realize that the agent worked for the CIA.

REP. JOHN CONYERS, D-Mich., asked Colby if he was aware of an agent being placed in a congressional campaign.

"Not placed," Colby responded. "I am aware of a CIA agent, visiting America from abroad, who was invited by a candidate to accompany him for a few days. The candidate did not know that he was a CIA agent."

Conyers asked if the candidate won or lost.

"I think he lost," Colby said.

"That follows," Conyers said with a touch of sarcasm.

"The CIA had nothing to do with him losing," Colby said.

Colby said he could not identify the candidate because to do so might reveal the identity of the agent, who is still working for the CIA overseas.

"I TAKE A strong position on protecting the identity of CIA agents," Colby said. "We are having a hard time just now."

Conyers responded, "I take a strong position on the CIA helping people win the congressional election. We don't know if there are more (cases of) CIA agents."

Colby said.

In response to a question from Rep. Bella Abzug, D-N.Y., chairman of the House Government Operations Committee's subcommittee on government information and individual rights, Colby confirmed that the agent filed reports to Operation Chaos.

"Is that proper?" Abzug asked.

"No," Colby said. "I have corrected the errors of the past. It will not occur again."

COLBY ALSO said the CIA has files on between 70 and 75 members of Congress. He said that if any member asks for information from his file the agency will provide it. He said about 30 lawmakers have filed such requests.

The hearing was frequently acrimonious. Colby insisted that further investigations could damage the nation's intelligence system while Democrats on the committee accused the director of failing to provide adequate information to permit the Congress to supervise the CIA.

"The United States has developed the best intelligence service in the world," Colby said. "We must not destroy it through sensational or irresponsible exposure."

Colby and Abzug clashed sharply, with accusing the CIA of sharing its files and information with other government agencies "much like back-fence gossip."

The purpose of the hearings is to determine if the CIA should continue to enjoy an exemption from the Privacy Act of 1974.

IN HIS OPENING statement Colby said Congress should limit its prying into agency secrets.

"If American intelligence is to continue to be effective, there must be limits to public exposure of its activities," the CIA director said.

But Abzug said such arguments are an attempt by the CIA "to blind the

Congress and the American people to the fact that no agency like the CIA can function properly if it is going to violate every single law of the country."

She then cited examples from the Rockefeller Commission report of CIA mail openings, attempts to disrupt dissident groups and other violations of the agency's charter.

Even before Colby was permitted to read his opening statement he and the chairman engaged in a heated exchange.

Abzug asked why Richard Ober, operational head of Operation Chaos, had not come as a witness. "I will speak for the agency," Colby replied.

"IS THERE any reason why he is not here this morning?" Abzug snapped. "I did not ask him to come," Colby replied blandly.

"Are you aware that the committee wanted him to come?" Abzug asked.

"I have been so informed," Colby replied.

Meanwhile, House Democratic leaders are urging the antagonists in the battle that has immobilized the House CIA committee to paper over their differences soon so that the long-stalled investigation can get started.

House Speaker Carl Albert, Democratic Floor Leader Thomas P. O'Neill and Caucus Chairman Philip Burton have made it

plain that they want a settlement that will not invite charges of cover-up.

Rep. Michael Harrington, D-Mass., whose harsh criticism of Committee Chairman Lucien Nedzi contributed to the impasse, said Albert, O'Neill and Burton yesterday urged him to get together with Nedzi in the hopes of reaching an accommodation.

But a spokesman for Nedzi, D-Mich., said the chairman was not interested in a "patch-up" agreement that would restore a situation which Nedzi had earlier found "intolerable."

THE HOUSE investigation broke down into internal strife earlier this month when a majority of the committee's Democrats demanded that Nedzi quit as chairman because the Michigan Democrat had been briefed on CIA misdeeds and had not informed other members of the panel.

In response to the attacks on him, Nedzi submitted his resignation as chairman, saying the situation had become "intolerable." However, the House refused to accept the resignation, an action which Nedzi considers a vote of confidence in him and a vote of no confidence in the dissidents.

Harrington said Albert, O'Neill and Burton emphasized to him that they want a solution as soon as possible, preferably before the House begins its July 4th holiday on Friday.

LONDON TIMES  
23 June 1975

## KGB or CIA?

From Princess Elizabeth of Yugoslavia

Sir, Of the two major powers, I wonder which side sports the greater number of secret agents?

Is it mere Soviet discretion, or are we so intimidated by "Big Brother" that the activities of the KGB always seem to be overshadowed by those of the CIA?

Yours faithfully,  
ELIZABETH BALFOUR,  
215 Kings Road, SW3.

WASHINGTON POST  
1 July 1975

## Drug Suspect Spied For CIA, It Admits

Reuter

The Central Intelligence Agency admitted yesterday that a suspected member of a multimillion-dollar opium ring had spied for the agency in Thailand.

But the CIA denied in a letter that Puttapon Khrumkhruan, 30, a Burmese, had been ordered to do anything illegal.

Drug charges against Khrumkhruan and a U.S. Peace Corps volunteer in Thailand, Bruce Hoefft, were dropped mysteriously last year by federal prosecutors.

Four others have pleaded guilty to smuggling charges and the government is seeking two fugitives in the case, involving \$2.5 million worth of opium seized in Chicago in 1973.

Acting CIA Director Carl Duckett told Sen. Charles H. Percy (R-Ill.) in a letter that Khrumkhruan was hired in 1972 to report on drug activities.

But he said the CIA refused to provide witnesses or records lest its drug intelligence operations in Thailand be uncovered. Percy had asked if charges against the two were dropped because the agency failed to cooperate with the prosecutors.

Khrumkhruan was arrested in 1973 while studying at Syracuse University in New York State under a program sponsored by the Agency for International Development.

He was reported to have returned to Chiang Mai, Thailand, last October after charges were dropped.

U.S. Customs officials broke the drug case in early 1973 when they seized 59 pounds of raw opium in film canisters, and found one package with Khrumkhruan's Chiang Mai address on it.

CIA documents supplied to Percy indicated that Khrumkhruan had admitted to federal officials that he was engaged in shipping narcotics. He also said he furnished the wrapping paper and string for this shipment.

The CIA said in the letter that Khrumkhruan had identified other people in the case.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR  
24 June 1975

## Detente for spies

Several points are raised by the disclosure of large-scale Soviet eavesdropping on American private phone traffic. They are among the reasons for serious consideration of a step that has never been taken seriously before: adding to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) a mutual Soviet-American effort to limit clandestine activities, too.

The first point is that, in the midst of all the criticism of the CIA, no one should forget the pervasive operations of its Soviet counterparts — all without the curbing exemplified in America's current wave of self-investigation. The Rockefeller commission is reported to have heard testimony that congressmen and businessmen are among the Americans whose long-distance phone calls have been monitored by the Russians. The question is raised whether the information thus gained could be used by the Soviet KGB to influence or perhaps even recruit Americans.

Other points involve the United States response to the Soviet activities. U.S. agents allegedly had a sort of dial-a-spy system to listen in on what the Russians listened in on. As a senator reportedly complained, "Apparently . . . our own intelligence agencies knew about it and didn't tell us. What we must determine is how that information was being used by our own people and why they didn't stop the flow immediately."

Now the whole subject has to be investigated, along with other intelligence activities concerning law-abiding American citizens. Clearly it would be in the long-range interest of reducing both domestic and international tensions to cut down on at least the "dirty tricks" of U.S. and Soviet espionage.

If such a prospect seems like pie in the sky, it may come a little closer because of spies in the sky. High-flying cameras and other technological advances can more accurately provide much of the information for which cloak-and-dagger means used to be relied on. In Sunday's Washington Post, Arthur M. Cox, a former State Department and CIA official, made a ground-breaking case for technology plus detente and arms control creating a situation for negotiation toward mutual phasing out of clandestine operations by the U.S. and the Russians. He acknowledges doubts that the closed society of the Soviet Union would ever give up such activities. "But," he adds, "if we intend to move ahead with a growing detente, now is the time to find out." Indeed it is.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR  
30 June 1975

## Kelley cites rise in foreign agents

By Reuter

Washington

Federal Bureau of Investigation director Clarence M. Kelley says a steady increase in the number of foreign agents in the United States has posed a substantial threat to U.S. security.

Declining to discuss details in an open session, he told the House of Representatives judiciary subcommittee on civil liberties that the United States has been designated a prime target by the intelligence services of Communist-bloc countries.

"The intensity of their operations against us may be gauged by the steady increase of intelligence officers assigned to the United States," Mr. Kelley said. "Hostile intelligence operations carried out by these individuals are highly sophisticated and varied in nature."

The director said Congress would cripple the FBI's ability to meet the threat from foreign agents if it were to enact approved pending proposals that would restrict the government's conducting of wiretaps and electronic surveillance in cases dealing with national security.

Mr. Kelley's testimony came in the wake of disclosures by the Justice Department that electronic surveillances conducted by the government in the name of national security sharply increased since 1972 and a court ruling that the government must obtain a warrant before installing a wiretap even in cases of national security when the victims of the tap are not agents of or collaborators with a foreign power.

Mr. Kelley strongly objected to a provision in one bill that would require the Justice Department to show probable cause that a subject for surveillance was a foreign agent engaged in activities threatening national security.

Under present procedure, wiretaps and bugs have been installed without a court order when the Attorney General or other government officials have determined it was necessary to protect national security or to obtain foreign intelligence.

In criminal cases, however, prior court authorization is required for a wiretap.

Los Angeles Times Fri., June 20, 1975

## ARMS CONTROL DEPENDS ON INTELLIGENCE

## Like It or Not, the CIA Plays a Vital Role

BY ERNEST CONINE

Fred C. Ikle, chief of the U.S. arms control agency, uttered some words of caution the other day that deserve sober consideration in the witch-hunting atmosphere which now surrounds the Central Intelligence Agency.

In an address to the Pittsburgh World Affairs Council, Ikle expressed concern that too much exposure of too many secrets could damage, irreparably, the ability of the CIA and other intelligence-gathering organizations to do their jobs. And if that happens, he warned, you can kiss goodbye the prospect of future progress in arms control negotiations.

Arms control is not, of course, the only area of U.S. national policy which will be deeply affected by the way in which the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, headed by Sen. Frank Church (D-Ida.), conducts its investigation of the nation's intelligence apparatus.

However, one need go no further than the strategic arms limitation talks—and the suspicions and uncertainties which they involve—to see that the maintenance of a dependable, proficient intelligence service is as important now as in the worst days of the cold war.

The Soviet Union is a closed society which does not publish details of its defense budget. There is no free press to report on deliberations within the Politburo, and no independent legislative body to demand explanations from the foreign policymakers and nuclear strategists. The Kremlin resolutely rejects proposals for on-site inspections by other parties to verify compliance with arms-control agreements.

Thus the United States can afford to enter into arms control agreements only to the extent that it has reliable means of checking for itself on Soviet compliance. And if such means are not available, it must err on the side of caution—conceivably passing up genuine opportunities to put a cap on the nuclear arms competition.

As Ikle told his Pittsburgh audience a week ago, "To have meaningful and reliable arms control, we have to know what the other side is doing. And we cannot find out simply by

asking... If we cannot maintain the privacy of certain intelligence activities, our arms control efforts will become paralyzed."

What's the big deal? it may be asked. After all, most intelligence is gathered these days through technological means rather than by cloak-and-dagger operators. And nobody is proposing that we stop using spy-in-the-sky satellites to keep photographic tabs on Soviet shipyards, missile sites and troop movements.

With photographs taken from cameras 100 miles above the earth, analysts can identify objects as small as 12 to 18 inches. Heat-sensitive satellites detect missile firings and nuclear tests. American radar tracks missile

*Ernest Conine is a member of The Times' Editorial Board.*

trajectories, and monitoring of electronic signals broadcast by the missiles back to Soviet scientists can provide vital data on the inwards of multiple warheads.

One problem, however, is that the Russians are playing games with provisions of existing SALT agreements which forbid either side from interfering with the other's technological means of verification. Canvas covers have been placed over missile launching sites to shield them from the prying eyes of U.S. space cameras, and efforts have been made to jam the telemetry receivers which are used to monitor details of Soviet missile tests.

Even without Soviet cheating, reconnaissance satellites cannot see inside a missile silo to determine precisely what kind of missile is there, nor can they see inside the missiles to determine whether multiple warheads are being deployed.

Most important of all, no satellite can ever see inside the heads of the Soviet leaders, to divine the degree of good faith with which they enter arms control accords.

Technological efforts are made to get around such problems. A massive network of listening posts records military and other radio communications. At one point the CIA is said to have actually built a system which tried, unsuccessfully, to listen in on Kremlin telephone conversations.

More successful was another project in which U.S. submarines tapped communications cables on Soviet coastal waters, and thus were able on occasion to intercept high-level military messages.

In the final analysis, however, it remains highly important to obtain intelligence from defectors or disgruntled Soviet citizens in key positions.

The most celebrated known case was that of Col. Oleg Penkovsky, who sat at the very nerve center of the Soviet military establishment. Without the detailed political and technical intelligence he provided, John F. Kennedy would have been in a very poor position to deal with the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.

Obviously, however, no Soviet informant in his right mind will deal with a CIA which is no longer able to keep a secret. Nor will friendly foreign intelligence services which may have such an agent in place.

It is disturbing that so many public officials and members of the press no longer seem willing to recognize that there is any such thing as a legitimate secret.

The New York Times, for example, published a story which not only disclosed the above-mentioned, previously supersecret submarine operation in Soviet coastal waters, but gave its code designation and the name of its chief operational officer. It is unclear what public right-to-know was served thereby.

Since then, an army of blabbermouths in both Congress and the Executive Branch have leaked rumors of political assassinations planned or carried out by the CIA, without waiting for the Senate committee to do its job. The media have rushed these into print without supporting evidence and without apparent concern for the damage which a distorted or erroneous leak could do to U.S. relations with other countries.

CIA Director William Colby has pleaded with Congress and the nation's editors and publishers to recognize that there are "bad secrets" about the CIA which must be exposed—but that there are also "good secrets" which must be kept.

Sure, it is a self-serving request. But it is also a very accurate reflection of reality.

BALTIMORE SUN

19 June 1975

James J. Kilpatrick

## Times Almost Breaks Arm Patting Its Own Back

Washington.

The Rockefeller commission released its report on the Central Intelligence Agency the night of June 10, and the morning of June 11, the New York Times almost broke an arm patting itself on the back. It was a remarkable acrobatic exercise; it merits a round of faint applause.

The Times started all this business about the CIA with a spread-eagled story by Seymour Hersh December 22. It is useful to recall exactly what was charged at the time. This was the accusation: That

"the CIA, directly violating its charter, conducted a massive, illegal domestic intelligence operation during the Nixon administration against the anti-war movement and other dissident groups in the United States."

In its lead story of June 11, the Times exulted that the Rockefeller commission's report "confirmed the basic elements of an article in the New York Times December 22."

If you perceive that a couple of elements are missing, your perception is functioning nicely. Curiously, these identi-

cal elements also were missing from a story on page 22, in which the Times again lauded the Times. The page 22 encomium said that the commission's report "affirmed in virtually every respect an account in the New York Times last December 22 of a 'massive, illegal domestic intelligence operation against the anti-war movement and other dissident groups in the United States.'"

Suppose we put this affair in perspective. The commission report does not confirm that the CIA conducted these

## over CIA

"massive" and "illegal" operations in "direct violation of its charter." On the contrary, the report emphasizes that the CIA's charter is vague, ambiguous, and subject to conflicting interpretations by reasonably minded men. The report does assert that over the past 28 years, a few men in the CIA did a few things that were "plainly unlawful."

What about a key element in the original Times story, that these horrid things happened "during the Nixon ad-

administration"? That element seems to have dropped down the memory hole. The report makes it clear that Operation CHAOS, as it came to be known, began August 15, 1967, in response to "continuing, substantial pressure" from President Johnson. Yes, the operation continued "during the Nixon administration," but the genesis was with the Democratic administration.

Was the operation "massive"? In terms of the CIA's own commitment, it was miniscule. Fewer than 30 agents

were assigned to the project. At its peak, the staff totaled 52. In terms of the intelligence gathered, we may make our own judgments. Probably half a million persons were involved between 1967 and 1972 in anti-war dissidence. The CIA indexed 300,000 names. But "personality files" were compiled on only 7,200.

Was the operation "illegal"? In the commission's view, "some domestic activities of Operation CHAOS unlawfully exceeded the CIA's statutory authority." But that

finding has to be set against the commission's finding that the mission itself—to study foreign influence on domestic dissidence—was proper.

The great bulk of the CIA's investigation was lawful, prudent, and discreet. Files were kept under absolute security. The commission could find no evidence that the CIA at any time engaged in any "personal or electronic surveillance, wiretaps, or unauthorized entries against any dissident group or individual."

Yes, the CIA is fairly sub-

ject to criticism for its excesses, and for knuckling under to the pressures applied by successive presidents. It is a human institution, subject to human error. But on balance, and considering the dirty, delicate, dangerous nature of its assignment, the CIA—at least in its domestic performance—merits far more credit than blame.

WASHINGTON POST  
19 June 1975

## KGB/CIA

AS ONE READS the entirely predictable Soviet-bloc reactions to the Rockefeller commission report published on this page today, it becomes evident that a bit of perspective is required. First, it needs to be said that the opportunity for hypocritical gloating and hostile propaganda given Moscow is a small price to pay for the public cleansing of the CIA that is now going on in Washington. Fortunately, Americans have not held back from the exercise out of the misguided notion that it is not worth the embarrassment, as welcome and useful to the Soviet KGB as that embarrassment unquestionably is. A society like ours, which rests on the knowing consent of the governed, has no other acceptable way to remedy the flaws that afflicted the CIA's performance by virtue of its abuse of secret power.

So, the United States has to be prepared to take its lumps. To read these "Other Voices" literally, however, one would think that the Soviet Union had never engaged in secret intelligence operations abroad or, for that matter, in police repressions at home. In fact, the Russians have never stopped engaging in both. The kinds of CIA activities now being uncovered in the United States are the normal fare of the KGB, an organization which, needless to say, does not have to fear that other elements of Soviet society or government will unmask it in public. Pravda is not likely to report, for instance, that KGB

subsidies sustain the strikes which are one of the minority Communist Party's principal anti-democratic tactics in Portugal today. Do not hold your breath waiting for a Politburo member to deplore the continuing surveillance of millions of Soviet citizens by the KGB.

The disclosure of CIA misdeeds tempts some properly outraged Americans to conclude that there is no real difference between the CIA and KGB, or between their respective societies. This is a critical point. Certainly both organizations have regarded themselves, at least in their foreign operations, as professional and patriotic. Whether one or the other has been more adventuresome or more effective abroad is, on the basis of the known facts, hard to say. In respect to domestic activities, however, no meaningful comparison can be made. The CIA and FBI function in a free society. There is a limit to how far they can stray. And they can be called to account; that is, in fact, what we are now witnessing. But the KGB represents the fundamental method of government in a country like the Soviet Union: there is hardly any limit short of outright Stalinist terror on what it can do, and there is no way to call it to account. We Americans sometimes lash ourselves rhetorically by declaring that there is no difference between ourselves and the Russians. But the preservation of that difference is actually the essential and welcome purpose of the current inquiry into the CIA.

Thursday, June 26, 1975

The Washington Star

# Does NSA Spy On U.S. Calls?

By James Deakin  
Special to The Washington Star

The Senate select intelligence committee has begun an investigation of reports that United States intelligence agencies have been monitoring telephone calls of American citizens in violation of federal law.

Congressional sources said the investigation will focus on the National Security Agency, a super-secret U.S. intelligence organization that intercepts and decodes radio and

other electronic communications of foreign nations.

Staff members of the select committee headed by Sen. Frank Church, D-Idaho, have had "initial contacts" with NSA officials, the sources said. They said the purpose of the investigation would be to determine whether there had been "abuses" in the agency's operations.

The NSA "has never been subjected to scrutiny by Congress," but its activities clearly come within the

investigation of the CIA and other U.S. intelligence units, the sources said.

They said the question of whether the NSA has been intercepting telephone conversations within the United States was "definitely one of the areas that will be explored" by the Senate committee.

**ALLEGATIONS THAT** the NSA has monitored telephone calls by American citizens, in apparent violation of federal statutes, have come to the attention of the National Commission for the review of Federal and State Laws Relating to Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance, it was learned.

A spokesman for the commission said, however, that the commission did not plan to investigate the allegations because "this is the purview of the Church committee."

The spokesman declined to discuss

the source of the reports but said they identified the NSA as the agency that allegedly had monitored telephone communications within the United States.

Asked to comment on the allegations, an NSA spokesman, Norman Boardman, said: "Oh no, we're not making any comment on that."

The St. Louis Post-Dispatch reported last week that Russian technicians, using space satellites or antennas on top of the Soviet embassy in Washington, were believed to be monitoring thousands of long distance telephone calls in the United States each year.

**BECAUSE U.S. electronic and computer technology is considered superior to that of Russia, many persons who pay close attention to the operations of U.S. intelligence agencies believe that they are conducting similar monitoring of telephone calls within the United States.**

The Rockefeller commission's report on the CIA said that the CIA had received 1100 pages of materials from "an international communications activity" conducted by "another agency of the government."

John Marks, a former intelligence officer for the State Department, identified the other agency as the NSA. The material apparently consisted of transcripts of overseas telephone calls, cables and other

communications by U.S. citizens who were being investigated as part of the CIA's "operation chaos."

**HOWEVER, THE Federal Communications Commission has received no information or complaints that similar monitoring of domestic telephone calls is being carried out by any U.S. intelligence agency, Fred McKinney, deputy chief of the FCC's field operations bureau, said.**

McKinney said the FCC's equipment is "not sophisticated enough" to determine whether space satellites or antennas are being used to intercept long distance calls that are transmitted through the air, by radio microwaves. About 70 percent of all long distance calls in the United States are transmitted by microwave relays.

Section 2511 of Title 18 of the United States Code makes it a criminal offense for unauthorized persons to intercept or to attempt to intercept "any wire or oral communication."

McKinney said this covers all telephone conversations, including those transmitted by microwaves. The maximum penalty for violations is a \$10,000 fine or five years' imprisonment or both.

Another statute, the Communications Act of 1934, makes it a federal offense to intercept "any radio communication." McKinney said telephone calls transmitted by mi-

crowaves "clearly fit the definition of radio communications."

Both statutes permit monitoring by certain authorized individuals and organizations, but in neither case does the list of exemptions include personnel of intelligence agencies or the agencies themselves.

From computer banks of thousands or hundreds of thousands of telephone conversations, individual conversations can be retrieved by programming "catch words," said Charles Morgan of the American Civil Liberties Union.

"You merely program the computer to retrieve all conversations in which the word 'military' occurs, or 'Russian' or whatever subject you are interested in," he said. "The computer scans thousands of conversations and comes up with those that have the catch words in them."

An indication of some of the more sophisticated ways of storing and retrieving telephone conversations was given in testimony last year by Stephen J. Lukasik, former director of the Defense Departments Advanced Research Projects Agency.

"A computer system has been demonstrated that is capable of understanding speech and acting on the substantive content of the speech," Lukasik told the defense subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee.

WASHINGTON POST  
17 June 1975

Clayton Fritchey

## CIA: A White House Remedy

The more the Rockefeller Commission's report on its investigation of the Central Intelligence Agency is studied, the clearer it is that there's not much wrong with the agency that a change of presidential performance wouldn't cure. Reform should begin at the White House.

The commission did not ignore the culpability of Presidents over the years, but it more or less confined itself to saying softly that only "some" of the agency's questionable activities "were initiated or ordered by Presidents, either directly or indirectly."

The actual record, however, indicates that most of major violations and most of the significant delinquencies can be traced back to White House pressure of one kind or another over the last two decades, regardless of whether the Democrats or Republicans were in power.

In rare instances, some of our chief executives have stepped up and accepted the blame for CIA undertakings that backfired. Dwight Eisenhower personally took responsibility for the U-2 incident, which set back détente with the Soviet Union for a decade. John F. Kennedy later took the blame for the CIA's disastrous Bay of Pigs Cuban invasion.

On the whole, however, the White House has consistently gone to great pains to conceal its pressures on the CIA, the chief reason being that the pressures were often motivated more by political than security considerations, as in former President Nixon's efforts to subvert the agency in the Watergate cover-up.

The full story of the CIA's assassina-

tion activities has yet to come out, but all signs suggest that these initiatives were essentially White House specials. Even now the public doesn't have all the facts about CIA's hidden role in overthrowing various foreign governments (as in Iran, Chile and Guatemala), but they could not have been undertaken except by presidential direction.

It is not easy even for the most courageous CIA directors to resist a determined President when, in the name of alleged national security, he wants something done that may seem improper, reckless or possibly illegal. Who is the director to challenge the commander-in-chief? Anyhow, uncooperative directors can readily be replaced.

Once in a long while an agency head will defy a President, as the late J. Edgar Hoover did when Nixon tried to establish a government-wide undercover spy and intelligence operation, involving proposed burglary and illegal mail interception. Hoover merely asked Nixon to put it in writing, which was enough to kill it, but the independence of the FBI chief was so rare that it is still being talked about. The other agencies involved, including the CIA, went along with Nixon's scheme.

The Rockefeller Commission suggests Presidents should be more scrupulous and CIA directors more principled. That would be nice, but it is not likely that future chief executives and CIA chiefs will, on the average, be any better than their predecessors.

"Simply an admonition of that kind is plainly not adequate," says Sen.

Frank Church (D-Ida.), chairman of the Senate Select Committee that is investigating all government intelligence. "What we need," Church says, "is a law with criminal penalties." And beyond that, as everybody, including the Rockefeller Commission, now agrees, is the need for relentless congressional monitoring of all CIA activity, especially in the political realm.

Since 1947, when the CIA was established, 150 resolutions have been introduced in Congress to provide different types of formal oversight of the agency, but up to now it has escaped being leashed. In recent years it has reported to a feeble, informal congressional "watchdog" group, which hardly ever meets and never asks questions when it does.

Not even the supersensitive Atomic Energy Commission, which guards the most crucial secrets of all, is free of strict congressional supervision. The CIA's argument against oversight is the alleged danger of "leaks." Opponents of the congressional Joint Atomic Energy Committee once said the same thing, and in almost 30 years there has never been a serious breach by members of that group.

Future CIA directors should welcome a similar permanent joint committee on intelligence, for then future Presidents would have to think twice before giving dubious secret orders that would have to be disclosed to a demanding oversight group, especially if it were headed up by someone with the purposeful integrity of a Frank Church.

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THE WASHINGTON POST Thursday, July 10, 1975

## Haig Describes Probe of Leaks

## Mistrust of Kissinger Hinted

By Timothy S. Robinson

Washington Post Staff Writer

Gen. Alexander M. Haig has suggested that mistrust by members of the White House staff in 1969 of then-National Security Council aide Henry Kissinger may have prompted the sending of identical dual reports from the FBI to both Kissinger and President Nixon about wiretaps of newsmen and government officials.

The newsmen and government officials were tapped as part of a wide-ranging probe of alleged leaks of classified information to the press. Haig's comments about Kissinger were made in a deposition filed yesterday in U.S. District Court in a lawsuit by one of the tapped persons, former national security aide Morton Halperin, and is Haig's most detailed public description of his role in that program.

The deposition describes in detail the climate in which the taps were placed on newsmen and government officials, and traces Haig's role as the proposed brief surveillances of 17 persons developed over the next two years. Haig himself describes his role as a "conduit" in the operation, neither an "urger or an advocate or a disadvocate."

However, his answers to the deposition portray him as the sole liaison between the White House and the FBI for the early part of the program, and the person who personally set up the procedures, transmitted to the FBI the names of many of the persons to be tapped, and who would read the wiretap reports at FBI head-

quarters and tell Kissinger what as in them.

He quit making the oral reports to Kissinger after a while, he said, and the FBI began sending written reports to both Kissinger and Nixon. One reason for the written reports, Haig suggested, was because some White House aides might not have been "totally comfortable with Dr. Kissinger's own reporting of information."

"He was suspect, to some individuals—I cannot say who—to some he may have been perceived to be part of the problem" of leaks, Haig continued.

He said White House staffers "who were loyalist and partisan in their perception" may have been suspicious of Kissinger because he had worked in the Kennedy administration "and there were many people at that time that were accusing him of being very left of center."

Haig was at the time an aide to Kissinger in the National Security Council. He subsequently became White House chief of staff in the last year and a half of the Nixon administration and is now head of NATO forces in Europe.

In the deposition Haig said although the investigation of alleged leaks began after a New York Times story on then-secret Cambodian bombing plans, it grew out of an atmosphere of "continuing hemorrhaging of highly classified information into the media."

He pointed out, for example, that a memorandum that grew

out of the very first meeting of the NSC during the Nixon administration was "I believe in 48 hours, compromised in the New York Times."

He said that when the wiretap program began he was "absolutely confident that Dr. Kissinger conveyed to me instructions that he had received from the President, and he did mention the director of the FBI having been in and approving this program."

Haig told FBI Associate Director William Sullivan that the program was highly sensitive and discussed "trailing and surveillance and other investigations to accompany the overall assessment of a man's reliability."

Haig said one reason he suggested to the FBI that little unnecessary paperwork be kept on the program grew out of his knowledge of an incident that occurred when he worked in the Pentagon under then Defense Secretary Robert McNamara in the early 1960s.

At that time, then FBI director J. Edgar Hoover "sent over a report on Martin Luther King, which just about blew the Pentagon apart, it was so—you know, anti-King in character and hand-tailored by Mr. Hoover to be damaging. And it was flushed all through the bureaucracy. I remember Mr. McNamara thought that was a deliberate thing by the director to jeopardize Mr. King, and I think that is the kind of concerns that we had," Haig said.



# GENERAL

NEW YORK TIMES  
6 July 1975

## A False Navy Report Alleged in Sub Crash

*Ex-Crew Members on U.S. Vessel Tell of  
Collision With Russian Craft Off Soviet*

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 5—The commander of a Navy submarine on an intelligence patrol inside Soviet waters was ordered to file a series of falsified reports in late 1969 after a collision at sea with a Soviet submarine, according to former crew members.

The American submarine, the U.S.S. Gato, was on a highly classified reconnaissance mission as part of what the Navy called the Holystone program when she struck the Soviet submarine about 15 to 25 miles off the entrance to the White Sea, in the Barents Sea in northern Russia, the crew members said. During the patrol, they added, the Gato had been as close as one mile off the Soviet coast.

### 25 Copies Prepared

The Holystone operation, which more recently has carried the code names Pinnacle and Bollard, involves the use of specially equipped electronic submarines to spy inside the waters of the Soviet Union and other nations. The intelligence-gathering operation was initiated in the early nineteen-sixties.

The former crew members of the Gato said that a few days after the collision, their commanding officer was ordered by the Navy's Atlantic Fleet command in Norfolk, Va., to prepare 25 copies of a top-secret after-action report alleging that the submarine had broken off her patrols two days before the date of the collision because of a propeller shaft malfunction.

In addition, the crew members said, the Gato commander was told to prepare six accurate reports describing the collision and the events immediately after the collision, and to hand-deliver those to a unit of the Atlantic Fleet command after returning to the East Coast.

### False Reports Acknowledged

Capt. Lawrence Burkhardt 3d, the Gato's commanding officer at the time of the collision, is now serving at the Pentagon with the Navy's Bu-

reau of Personnel. Through an aide, he refused to discuss any aspect of the 1969 patrol because of its classified nature.

Navy officials and high-ranking former members of the Defense Department acknowledged in interviews that the collision, as cited by crew members of the Gato, did occur. The officials also acknowledged that some falsified reports of the incident may have been prepared.

But the officials insisted that the collision had been properly reported to the National Security Council and the 40 Committee, the high-level review group headed by Secretary of State Kissinger that approved the Gato mission.

"I don't know where that particular order [to falsify reports] came from," one former Pentagon official said, "but the honest reports went to the 40 Committee."

"The people who had an absolute need to know knew about it," the official added.

A spokesman for the Navy similarly provided assurances, after checking with the Atlantic Fleet command, that appropriate officials on the 40 Committee had received written reports of the collision.

### Some Not Informed

But dozens of interviews during the last month with intelligence officials who had firsthand knowledge of Holystone operations in late 1969 were unable to provide any evidence that details of the collision had been fully provided to appropriate members of the National Security Council and the State Department.

In addition, a former official of the Central Intelligence Agency, who said he knew of other incidents involving the Navy's Holystone operations, also said that he had not been informed of the Gato's collision.

And a well-informed official of the Ford Administration who has access to intelligence information said last week, after conducting a check of White House files, that he was unable to "find any record of any such thing [the collision] having taken place." He added, "And I'm reasonably confident that we would have found it."

### Extreme Secrecy

Because of the extreme secrecy surrounding the Navy's Holystone operations, it was impossible to determine fully who had been told what about the collision.

The command-and-control structure appears entirely dependent on accurate and honest reporting from the military units involved in gathering intelligence, with apparently no known means for independent verification of such reporting.

Six officials were interviewed who had direct access to activities of the 40 Committee in late 1969—most of them participated in the committee's meetings—and none of them recalled learning any information about the Gato's collision.

Only two men, both high-ranking officials of the Defense Department, were able to say that they had learned of the collision shortly after it occurred.

Dozens of interviews with Government officials failed to determine why the Navy allegedly decided to order the falsification of the reports, nor was it possible to determine from whom the Navy reportedly sought to conceal the incident.

### Fake Termed 'Senseless'

"A fake report would be senseless," said one general who spent his career in clandestine intelligence reconnaissance operations. "It doesn't do anybody any good and ultimately it gets you in trouble."

He also said that he could not recall being briefed on the Gato's collision, although he said he was on active duty in a sensitive post at the time.

A senior official of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, which is investigating all aspects of United States intelligence operations, said in a telephone interview that the committee was looking into a number of command and control questions.

But the official refused to say specifically whether operations of the 40 Committee and the Navy's Holystone program were under investigation.

In an earlier account of the Holystone operations, The New York Times cited at least two known collisions between American and Soviet submarines, one of them in the mid-nineteen-sixties and the other on March 31, 1971. The latter incident was reported to the C.I.A. by the Pentagon, according to a memorandum cited in the Times article.

### '74 Collision Reported

Last Thursday, The San Diego Evening Tribune reported that another Holystone collision occurred in May, 1974, between an American intelligence-gathering submarine and a Soviet submarine. That collision, the newspaper said, occurred in Soviet waters off the port of

Petropavlovsk on the Kamchatka Peninsula.

Both submarines were armed with nuclear weapons, The Tribune said.

Crew members aboard the Gato said that their vessel was armed with nuclear weapons, too, including at least one Subroc torpedo missile, a nuclear weapon capable of destroying a submerged submarine up to 30 miles away.

One member of the crew said that he had studied the general operations orders for the Gato's Holystone mission in a classified briefing at the Atlantic Fleet command in Norfolk. The briefing took place in a secure room widely known inside the submarine fleet as the "spook shack," the crew member recalled.

### 4-Mile Limit Set

At the time, he said, the Gato had just been assigned to the reconnaissance patrol in Soviet waters. The general orders specifically forbade the Holystone submarines to go closer than four nautical miles from the Soviet coast, outside the three-mile international limit recognized by the United States but well inside the 12-mile limit claimed by the Soviet Union.

If detected inside the 12-mile limit and threatened, the crew member quoted the general orders as saying, the Holystone submarines "have authority to use weapons."

The Gato and all other Holystone submarines were specifically forbidden to use any active electronic or sonar gear while on the secret missions as a means of preventing detection by Soviet antisubmarine devices, the crew member said.

In addition, he said, all of the Gato's outside hatches, including the emergency escape hatch, had been lashed down before the submarine began her cruise from the Navy's submarine base in New London, Conn. This was necessary, he said, because the hatches sometimes rattled and thus could help the Russians detect the vessel.

### Cover Story Provided

The crew member also said that he and others were provided with an unclassified cover story that could be used to explain their long absence—most Holystone missions lasted 90 days—to their families and friends.

Because of the collision, the Gato's voyage was about a month short of normal Holystone operations. The submarine left New London in mid-October, 1969, and returned to the East Coast about Dec. 1.

As hazily reconstructed by the crew member, the men were told to say that they were involved in an undersea geodetic survey project that was using sonar to study ocean water temperatures to support data collected by satellites. He said the Gato crewmen were to use

the cover story "in case we got fished out"—that is, forced to surface by Soviet antisubmarine units.

The Gato's mission, the crew member said, was to sail to the entrance to the White Sea in northern Russia and to track vessels leaving the Soviet submarine base in Archangel on the White Sea.

#### Communications Monitored

The Gato had been modified before leaving New London, the crew member said, and a special compartment was constructed for eight members of the National Security Agency who sailed aboard the vessel during her Holystone mission. The men spent much of their time monitoring Soviet communications, the crew member said.

The National Security Agency, which had working components in all three services, is responsible for communications intelligence and routinely participates in all of the Navy's spy missions.

Once on station off the entrance to the White Sea, the crew member said, the Gato's mission was to detect and identify Soviet submarines in an effort to pick up their sonar patterns—known as audio signatures—and perhaps get some photographs of the submarine. To do this, the crew member said, the American submarine would covertly trail the Soviet vessel, staying in an area behind the ship's screws, or propellers, where Soviet sonar technicians could not hear the trailing submarine.

#### Drift Discovered

At one point, while waiting in the White Sea entrance for a Soviet submarine, the crew member said, the Gato's crew discovered that they had inadvertently drifted to within one nautical mile offshore.

"We goofed and so the skipper ordered the logs changed to indicate that we hadn't gone that close," the crew member said.

The crew member gave the following account:

At about 9 P.M. on the night of either Nov. 14 or Nov. 17, 1969, the Gato made her first contact with a Soviet submarine sailing from the White Sea into the Barents Sea.

Once the Soviet vessel's

course and speed were determined, the Gato's sonar men were responsible for charting her course. The sonar team made some errors or had some bad data.

As it was later reconstructed, the Soviet vessel was estimated to be traveling at eight knots and her position was fixed in part on that information. In fact, the Soviet vessel was traveling at seven knots and the Gato began overtaking it on the left.

As the Gato did so, the Soviet vessel appeared to be turning to the right—since the sonar men reported that her position relative to the Gato was changing.

#### Soviet Ship Overtaken

"So we assumed he [the Soviet submarine] had turned to the right and so we turned to the right," the crew member said. "As a result of overtaking him, we crossed his bow. As we reconstructed it, he hit us on about a 90-degree angle—almost perfectly perpendicular to us."

The crew member continued: "The Gato was struck in the heavy plating that serves as a protective shield around the vessel's nuclear reactor and sustained no serious damage."

However, the Gato's weapons officer immediately ran two decks below and prepared for orders to arm the vessel's Subroc nuclear torpedo and three smaller torpedoes that also carried nuclear warheads. Only one authentication—either from the ship's captain or her executive officer—was needed to prepare the torpedoes for launching.

No order came from Gato's captain because the Soviet vessel—obviously confused—made no attempt to pursue the Gato. Instead, she began utilizing her fathometer in an apparent effort to determine whether she had struck a seamount or a similar underwater object. The Soviet vessel surfaced moments later.

#### Air and Sea Search

Months afterward, the crew member said, analysts for the National Security Agency reported that Soviet planes and ships had relentlessly searched the area in an apparent effort to locate the American submarine.

After sailing underwater for nearly two days to reach a part of the Atlantic Ocean where she could break radio silence, the Gato told—in a coded message—Atlantic Fleet headquarters what had happened and requested instructions, the crew member said.

The crew member, who had access to all of the vessel's communications—coded or otherwise—during this period, said that the Gato was initially instructed to sail home.

"Then we started getting orders—marked for 'officers' eyes only"—telling us to prepare two patrol reports," the crew member said. He added:

"We were told to prepare a normal patrol report indicating that the patrol ended on Nov. 12—if the accident took place on the 14th. The idea was to show that we left our station on the 12th."

#### Message From 'Spook Shack'

The crew member said that the message originated in the "spook shack" in Norfolk, known as Office M-34, in the submarine headquarters of the Atlantic Fleet command. He said he did not know who signed the message or who initiated the order.

The crew member also said that the orders then called for a separate report to be filed "describing the entire patrol, including the incident. Only six copies were to be prepared and hand-delivered" to the submarine headquarters of the Atlantic Fleet upon arrival, he said. About 25 copies of the fake report, the normal number, also were to be made, the crew member said.

Both reports, up until two days before the collision, were identical, he said. The 25 falsified copies, he said, were sent to the M-34 office, where—among other uses—they would be shown to other submarine officers during preliminary briefings before future Holystone operations.

#### Crew Admonished

About 10 days out of port, the crew member continued, Captain Burkhardt summoned the more than 100 members of the crew and officers and "made a fairly solemn kind of pronouncement."

"He talked about what had happened," the crew member

said, "and told them that the whole [Holystone] program depended on people not knowing what we were doing. He admonished them not to tell their wives, cousins, brothers or anybody and mentioned that they were all subject to the U.C.M.J. [Universal Code of Military Justice]."

After the Gato returned to port, the crew member added, Captain Burkhardt—who, according to the crew member, had expressed concern for his future—kept his command. The submarine was repaired and the shipyard provided with a cover story to the effect that the executive officers of the Gato had damaged her while docking in Key West, Fla., early in the cruise, the crew member said.

He said he did not remember talking about it with fellow officers and sailors before the Gato returned to port.

Adm. Ephraim P. Holmes, who was commander-in-chief of the Atlantic Fleet at the time of the Gato incident and is now retired, refused to discuss the Holystone operation in a recent telephone interview.

"Those operations weren't being discussed when I left the Navy," he said. "And as far as I know, they still are not being discussed."

A number of other officers who held senior positions in the Atlantic command in late 1969 also refused to discuss the incident.

#### 'Never Heard' of Collision

One senior officer who had direct knowledge of National Security Agency matters at the time did say, however, that he had "never heard" of the Gato's collision.

One Navy official suggested that the illegal false reports were in fact correct because, he said, "our policy is to provide the information that's needed to the appropriate people in the Government."

A former senior Pentagon official, who was told of the incident after it occurred, said that "the Navy, in retrospect, probably shouldn't have told them to cover their time." He added, "There shouldn't have been any reports."

It was impossible to determine from whom the Navy, by calling for falsified reports, was seeking to hide knowledge of the incident.

# Eastern Europe

NEW YORK TIMES  
4 July 1975

## Ford vs. Solzhenitsyn

Does President Ford know the difference between détente and appeasement? This unlikely question arises in light of the news that President Ford decided not to receive Nobel laureate Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn because to do so would be inconsistent with détente. Thus one of the world's leading writers, the most eloquent contemporary Russian enemy of dictatorship, was snubbed by an occupant of the White House who finds time to receive eminent soccer players and lovely cotton queens.

Yet the Soviet Union has repeatedly indicated that it regards détente as perfectly compatible with the most exaggerated ideological warfare against the United States. Neither Leonid Brezhnev nor any other high Soviet official has ever been known to refuse to receive American Communist party leaders for fear of upsetting détente. Quite the contrary, major foreign Communists (including American) are normally given red-carpet treatment in Moscow.

Basically, détente seeks to avoid military confrontation and to reduce risk of World War III. It even heightens the importance of the peaceful competition of ideas and accentuates the desirability of free exchange of information—points the Russians have been resisting in the current negotiations over the European security treaty. Instead of rebuffing Mr. Solzhenitsyn, Mr. Ford ought to have welcomed him as the most noted spokesman for a subterranean but important element of Soviet public opinion.

In contrast to Mr. Ford's confusion was the refreshing example of détente at work given by the group of United States Senators who have just completed a trip to Moscow, during which they spoke at length with both Mr. Brezhnev and his veteran Politburo colleague Mikhail A. Suslov. There was evidently blunt speaking on both sides, with no effort to avoid what either the Soviet or American leaders regard as the truth in order to spare the others' sensibilities. Mr. Suslov, for example, complained about what he regarded as United States failures to honor its commitments in the fields of arms limitations and expanded trade; the Senators in turn emphasized American suspicions of Soviet intentions and the moral importance of the issue of free emigration.

The Soviet leaders' friendly attitude toward their Senatorial visitors suggests that the Kremlin chiefs respect most those partners in détente who face issues directly as the prelude to finding mutually satisfactory solutions. It is unlikely that Mr. Brezhnev in his heart has any more respect for appeasers than does Mr. Ford.

WASHINGTON POST  
8 July 1975

## Helms Scores Treatment of Solzhenitsyn

United Press International  
Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) charged yesterday that President Ford declined to meet with dissident Russian author

WASHINGTON STAR  
9 July 1975

## Snubbing Solzhenitsyn

After first suggesting that President Ford's "crowded schedule" left no room for Alexander Solzhenitsyn last week, the White House has finally admitted that "foreign policy considerations" played a part.

The President is a busy man; one is reluctant to make too much of this ridiculous incident, which no excuse could possibly excuse.

Mr. Solzhenitsyn should have been received at the White House — not as a symbol of "freedom," not as a buddy of George Meany's, not because it might disgruntle Mr. Brezhnev, but rather because he is one of the few living masters of the written word, a Nobel laureate and a distinguished guest. His political opinions and his example in the resistance to oppression are important; but their importance derives in large measure from his distinction as a man of letters.

His snubbing at the White House, like the exaggerated attention given last week to his attack on détente, shows how few rituals in this town break free of politics, even when they should. Those who advised Mr. Ford to forget courtesy for "foreign policy considerations" have set a poor standard for presidential hospitality. (It is an alarming thought, by the way, that relations with the Soviet Union are so delicate as to be discombobulated by the reception of a writer.)

Americans expect a certain independence of political protocol in their Presidents. We have come a long way — too far, some would say — since Thomas Jefferson wore his bedroom slippers to dinner at the White House because he guessed, correctly, that his attire might offend the minister of Great Britain.

Alexander I. Solzhenitsyn because White House advisers warned such a meeting would offend the Soviet Union.

Helms, in a Senate speech, said Mr. Ford's advisers took the position, "Oh no, Mr. President, it might make the Russians mad at us," if he were to extend an invitation to the exiled Soviet writer to visit him at the White House.

The White House has maintained Mr. Ford could not see the Nobel Prize winner because of the President's "crowded schedule." But press secretary Ron Nessen said yesterday he "thinks it is fair to say" that a meeting between Mr. Ford and Solzhenitsyn would have foreign policy implications.

Helms said, "This country has come to a sad impasse

when the United States of America must tremble in timidity and refuse to see a man dedicated to freedom."

Solzhenitsyn delivered a speech to the AFL-CIO leadership in Washington last week that was highly critical of Soviet communism and America's détente policy with Russia.

Nessen maintained Mr. Ford's busy schedule prevented a White House invitation, but he added there are usually "a variety of reasons" for such decisions.

Without revealing its recommendations, Nessen also said the National Security Council, headed by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, had advised the President about seeing Solzhenitsyn.

LOS ANGELES TIMES  
25 June 1975

## OLD MENSHEVIK LEADER CHARGES DISTORTIONS

# 'Solzhenitsyn's Deeds Sadden and Pain Me'

BY MIKHAIL YAKUBOVICH

In "The Gulag Archipelago," Alexander Solzhenitsyn devoted almost eight pages (not counting a number of rather verbose footnotes) to this humble author. That, I feel, gives me a decided right to add a kind of postscript—in my mind, a necessary one—to this book, which is so widely acclaimed in the West.

In the second volume of "Gulag," Solzhenitsyn tells us that, soon after his trial, he was recruited by security personnel at the prison camp to work as a secret informer under the assumed name of "Vetrov." Since I, too, was imprisoned for 24 years, and emerged well versed in the prison life of the time, I was literally flabbergasted by such a disclosure. If it had not been made by Solzhenitsyn himself, I would not have believed it. How could he, a man who laid claim to the role of prophet, have been part of the secret police—the very GPU which he reviled in his "Gulag." (The GPU was the predecessor of the KGB.)

But Solzhenitsyn continues: "Yes, I signed to the effect that I'd inform, and let myself be christened 'Vetrov,' but in reality I managed not to inform upon anybody." Now, this contention is absolutely incredible.

In the light of this sensational and sudden revelation, certain facts from Solzhenitsyn's literary and political biography should, perhaps, be reconsidered. For instance, how did he come to be transferred from the ordinary prison camp in which he became a secret informer, to a special privileged camp, the "Sharashka," where secret scientific researches were kept? (Indeed, this was the very camp to which he devoted his novel, "The First Circle.")

There is only one answer to that question: He gained entrance into the privileged camp through his activities as a secret informer. Therefore, Solzhenitsyn's assurances that the good-naturedly put up with the fact that "Vetrov" gave them no information and,

Earlier this year the Soviet government launched a new campaign to discredit Nobel Prize-winning author Alexander Solzhenitsyn and his monumental account of the Soviet prison system, "The Gulag Archipelago." It is against this background that the accompanying article, submitted to The Times through the Soviet embassy in Washington, should be read.

Its author, Mikhail Petrovich Yakubovich, was an important leader of the Menshevik Party during the 1917 Russian revolution. Subsequently, he held governmental posts in the areas of finance and international trade. In 1930 Yakubovich was convicted of "economic sabotage" during the Menshevik Union Trials. An account of the 24 years he subsequently spent in Soviet prison camps plays an important part in Solzhenitsyn's "Gulag."

While Yakubovich, now 84 and living in a government rest home in Kazakhstan, today claims that Solzhenitsyn's portrayal of his life is distorted, there is some evidence that he did not always believe so.

In a March 21 letter to The Times, Nadezhda Markova Ulanovskaya, in whose Moscow apartment Solzhenitsyn and historian Roy Medvedev once interviewed Yakubovich, had this to say: "Yakubovich has never stated either in his correspondence or in his conversations with friends that Solzhenitsyn distorted his story. He emphatically maintained in conversations with myself and our friends that the facts in 'Gulag Archipelago' about him were all correct. He only disagreed with the interpretation provided."

then, sent him to work in a special camp, are pure nonsense.

But another question arises: Why did he make this confession which may damage his reputation?

The explanation, it seems to me, is psycho-

logical—but simple. Enjoying his fame in the West as a fearless fighter of "barbarian communism," Solzhenitsyn may be sitting on his bag of gold; but, nevertheless, he knows no peace.

He is undoubtedly terrified of retribution. Afraid of being called to account for his deed, by those upon whom he informed, he is also fearful that the State Security Committee (KGB) may someday expose him. What a blow either would be to the moral reputation of the "prophet."

Thus, we come to the reasoning behind Solzhenitsyn's own self-exposure: "Yes," Solzhenitsyn would say, "I was a secret informer. I was christened 'Vetrov,' but I really informed on no one. I managed to avoid fulfilling the commitments I had taken upon myself, and this confession of mine is proof of that." In other words, his books are as much attempts to convince and exonerate himself as to convince the world.

In "The Gulag Archipelago," Solzhenitsyn's hatred of socialism and the revolution develops with fiendish pleasure. In evaluating my own tragic role in the Soviet Union's history, I feel great pain and regret. But I cannot find in my heart any kindred response to the malicious delight that permeates Solzhenitsyn's memories.

In reporting conversations I once had with him about my activities in the revolution and, later, at the Menshevik Union Bureau trial, he scoffingly distorted their true essence and character. In his egocentric way, he used people as colors on the canvases of his books.

Solzhenitsyn longs for religious orthodoxy, autocracy and nationalism—a triad put forth by Count Uranov during the rule of Czar Nicholas I—for both himself and Russia. Yet his reverence for the three is only insofar as he can wield them at his own discretion.

Solzhenitsyn's deeds give me no pleasure; they sadden and pain me. He has placed himself on a pedestal, but it is one made of straw.

# East Asia

WASHINGTON STAR  
2 July 1975

## Korea and Vietnam: The Nonparallels

False analogies between Korea and Vietnam originally helped get us into a fundamentally worse situation in Vietnam. Let us not now reverse the process and panic over Korea because of analogies mistakenly drawn with Vietnam.

South Korea simply is not vulnerable at present to the two basic ills that destroyed South Vietnam—the uncertain loyalty of its people, and the resultant possibility for easy pen-

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etration and subversion by the North. At present it would require a massive external flow to overthrow the South, and there seems no sign of this happening.

Kim Il Sung, the northern dictator, is trying to take advantage of the sudden collapse in Vietnam to intimidate South Korea, but despite repeated cries of warning, the situation along the border in Korea is in actuality less menacing than at most times during the past two decades. Pyongyang does have more than twice the air strength of Seoul, but this advantage is offset by the presence of American air power in the South, while in ground forces the South outnumbered the North by about 600,000 men to 400,000, with reserves and paramilitary units that give an overall balance of 3 million to less than 2 million.

These figures reflect the facts that the South has more than twice the population of the North (in Vietnam it was the North that was the larger), and both regimes are as completely militarized as any in the world. Pyongyang could not risk war without the strong support of China or the Soviet Union, and both of these seem much more eager to avoid a conflict in Korea than they were in the past.

This may sound reassuring, but it concerns only the false crisis derived from mistaken analogies with Vietnam. Back of this, however, is a real danger that is escaping adequate attention, in part because of the red herring of Vietnam.

It is not an immediate crisis, but rather a situation that over a longer time span may produce conditions like those that proved fatal to South Vietnam. In other words, an ultimate, Vietnam-like debacle may be in the cards for us in Korea unless we start to do something about it soon.

The experiences of the Korean War made the South Koreans the most bitterly anti-Communist people in the world and therefore insured their loyalty to Seoul. But this shows signs of eroding.

There has always been much popular dissatisfaction with the government in South Korea. Despite rapid economic growth in recent years, the discrepancies in wealth were severe

and seemed to be growing worse. Corruption in government and business—recently highlighted by the admission of a \$4 million bribe to government authorities by the Gulf Oil Corp.—has always drawn much criticism. Except for a brief period in 1960-61 of ineffective Democratic government, Korea's democracy has always been imperfect and incomplete. Individual rights and freedoms were often curtailed.

But at the same time, there was enough individual liberty and democratic participation in government to make people feel that there was sufficient difference from the completely repressive regime of the North to make the South worth fighting to preserve.

This situation, however, has been changing of late. In October, 1972, President Park Chung Hee declared martial law and followed this with a new constitution, which, by giving him the right to appoint one-third of the members of Parliament, reduced that body and all electoral politics to a sham.

He followed this by Draconian measures seriously limiting individual freedoms, including those of political criticism and self-expression, and enforced these with brutal police controls. The opposition forces have been cowed into virtual silence, but hostility and tensions run deep.

Especially among the city dwellers and the better educated, including the bulk of the influential Protestant and Catholic groups, there is a sense of desperation. Student activism may have been successfully repressed; but probably at the cost of creating secret student revolutionaries. Step 1 has been taken toward the making of a Vietnamese situation.

South Korea has recently suffered another blow, this one not of its own making. Korea's dazzling economic record of recent years was based on industrialization and world trade—an incipient replica of the Japanese economic miracle—and therefore the oil crisis that started in the autumn of 1973 dealt Korea a serious blow.

It is particularly dependent on markets in and investments from Japan and the United States, and both these countries have themselves been in recessions. In addition, the picture of an increasingly repressive South Korean regime makes both Japanese and Americans more critical of conditions in Korea, more dubious about its future and less willing to invest there, thus adding to Korea's economic woes. A serious economic downturn could further erode South Korean loyalties.

The deterioration of the political situation in South Korea has also increased doubts about the American commitment to help defend the country. The post-Vietnam mood in the United States is reason enough for such doubts, but they are greatly increased by a picture of a dictatorial and cruelty repressive regime in Seoul,

which is repugnant to Americans.

The American commitment is hedged by the phrasing that "in case of an external armed attack" each nation "would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes." Still, the presence of about 40,000 American soldiers as a sort of trip-wire near the border has always made American involvement in a renewed Korean War seem almost automatic.

But this may well not be true, given the popular mood in the United States, as strengthened by the distasteful political actions of Park's government. In other words, the United States has made a commitment reinforced by a military presence that the American people would very possibly be unwilling to live up to. This is indeed a perilous position for the United States to be in.

Park or his successors have only two paths they can follow.

On the one hand, they can smother all political criticism and ruthlessly eradicate all sources of opposition. North Korea, North Vietnam and China itself show the viability of this sort of regime in an East Asian setting though it may be much more difficult to create one on a rightist rather than a leftist ideological basis, as the experience of the Chinese Nationalists suggest. Of course, this road would ultimately lead to the forfeiture of the American military commitment, and probably much of Japanese and American economic support.

The other road would be a return toward a more open society with a growing role for democratic political institutions. High educational levels make such a course perfectly feasible in Korea, and in my judgment it would be by far the better bet, even in stark military terms.

But what should the United States do? The tendency is to sweep the problem under the rug—to leave things alone and pretend the problem does not exist, counting on the improbability of war, at least in the near future, to see us safely through until some still unknown but, it is hoped, better situation develops later on.

In the very short run, this policy is understandable. The shock of the sudden collapse in Vietnam for Americans, Koreans and the world at large makes it wise to let the dust settle a bit before making any decisive new moves in Korea. But such a do-nothing policy cannot be allowed to continue indefinitely, as South Korean loyalties wither and popular American distaste for Korean dictatorship grows.

The defense of South Korea, regardless of the nature of its systems, is not vital to American interests. A defense line in the straits between Japan and Korea has always made more military sense than one in the middle of the peninsula. Aside from our emotional involvement in the well-being of the brave and talented people of



South Korea, our only major concern in the area is the adverse impact its fall to North Korea would have on Japan, a nation of very great importance to the United States.

A sudden collapse resulting in part from an American refusal to live up to its commitments might start a nervous Japan back on the road toward remilitarization, or might frighten it into a stance of much less cooperation with the United States on vital shared problems of economics and world order.

If, however, the United States had disengaged militarily from Korea by slow and well understood steps prior to a collapse, the impact might be quite negligible.

Now is the time, while the Vietnam dust is settling, to start thinking through this problem. We should before long have a clear program to present to Park of measured withdrawals of American troops and reductions of military aid until both are entirely gone within a few years -- unless the South Koreans find it

possible in the meantime to change course again and start moving back to a freer, more democratic system that would better win the loyalties of their own people and the support of the American public.

To avoid damaging shocks both in Korea and Japan, such a program would have to be spread over several years. Although the crisis is not an immediate one, we must start very soon if we are to complete the maneuver before the situation does reach crisis proportions.

The present is also a good time to start forming a longer-range Korean strategy. Korea has all along been a more dangerous threat to world peace than Vietnam, not just because it is a larger and more effectively militarized country, but because of its more strategic location between three of the largest nations of the world—Japan, China and the Soviet Union—with the fourth, the United States, deeply involved in the peninsula for historical reasons.

The surrounding great powers should move toward an agreement to isolate

this danger spot from other issues.

What is needed is a four-power agreement between the United States, the Soviet Union, China and Japan that they will not allow disturbances in Korea to spill over to involve them in their relations with one another.

The distrust and hostility between China and the Soviet Union stand in the way of such an agreement today, as does also the presence of American forces in the South. Such an agreement will not be easy to achieve but it is an obvious goal that the United States should be working toward now.

When achieved, it will not only neutralize one of the most dangerous trouble spots in the world, but may also take some of the tensions out of the situation in Korea itself. It could lead to agreed military limitations between the two Korean regimes; which would be an economic boon to both, and possibly, might open the way for ultimate reunification; which is of course the dream of all Koreans.

PLAYBOY

AUGUST, 1975

## THE CIA'S QUIET LITTLE WAR IN LAOS, OR WHAT'S TWO MILLION TONS OF BOMBS AMONG FRIENDS? By FRED BRANFMAN

Fred Branfman, 33-year-old codirector of the Indochina Resource Center in Washington, D.C., has lived for four and a half years in Indochina, three and a half of them in Laos as a researcher and writer and as an educational advisor with International Voluntary Services. A graduate of the University of Chicago with a master's degree in education from Harvard, Branfman speaks Laotian, French, Swahili, Hebrew and some Thai and is married to a Vietnamese. The following article will form part of "CIA: The President's Secret Army," a book based on his research into America's clandestine war efforts in Laos.

The current controversy over the CIA has concentrated on activities conducted by a relatively small number of people, ranging from the bugging of Soviet embassies to an occasional assassination attempt. But the CIA actually functioned as a major war-making body, spending unreported billions of dollars directing a military force of more than 100,000 Americans and Asians and dropping over 2,000,000 tons of bombs—as much tonnage as was absorbed by all of Europe and the Pacific theater during World War Two—on the tiny country of Laos.

To hear some officials describe the CIA men in Laos, one would think them a few dozen miracle men combining the qualities of Tom Dooley and Frank Merriwell to help the 30,000 guerrillas with whom they communicate in flawless native dialect. A strikingly different picture emerges from interviews with sources who know these CIA operators.

People are still talking about the exploits of one legendary CIA man in Laos. This guy, they say, offered a bounty for enemy ears—which could be deposited in a big plastic bag hanging on his porch—until his "boys" got car-

ried away and lopped off so many ears he had to discontinue the practice. Probably the most famous story recalls the time he gave a box to a pilot, asking him to deliver it to Pat Landry, his CIA boss at Udorn Air Force Base in Thailand. During the flight, the pilot noticed a progressively worsening odor, which he finally traced to the box. He tore it open—to find inside a fresh human head. The joke was to imagine Landry's reaction on opening the box. "I mean," said one source, collapsing with laughter, "what do you do with a human head? You can't just throw it in the wastepaper basket."

Four key organizations played a central role in the CIA's secret army structure. They were Air America, an airline owned and directly controlled by the CIA; Continental Air Services, Inc., which as Continental Airlines in the United States is a commercial firm but operated entirely separately in Laos; the U.S. Agency for International Development's Requirements Office; and the Air Force's 56th Special Operations Wing.

AA and Continental, or CASI, provided military air-transport service that, among other things, enabled the CIA's troops to carry out offensives during the rainy season, when Pathet Lao forces were mired down in mud. Air America and CASI drops of rice and armaments, too, were often what kept the Meo and Lao Theung hill

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tribes, the Thai mercenaries and Lao conscripts of the CIA's army fighting. For the hill people, these rice drops were the only means of survival, since they had been uprooted from their homes as many as four or five times.

The Requirements Office, one of the most powerful organizations in Laos, was established to receive and distribute all military goods coming into the country. CIA logistical control of the war through this office meant that those Laotian generals who cooperated with the CIA would get U.S. weapons; those who didn't wouldn't. The reason the office was given a USAID cover was, once again, part of the over-all attempt to keep the CIA secret army from public view. The lid was somewhat blown in 1970, when then-USAID director John Hannah took the unprecedented step of complaining publicly that the CIA was using his agency as a cover.

The 56th Special Operations Wing, a fleet of propeller-driven aircraft headquartered in Thailand, was first brought into the Laotian conflict as a means of carrying out extensive bombing raids by American, Lao and Thai pilots; later, it was used to support the many irregular activities of the Air Force's Blue Berets, the most publicized of which was the raid on Son Tay prison camp in North Vietnam. The exact tie-in between the CIA and the 56th SOW is not clear. Fletcher Prouty reports that in the late Fifties, he helped set up the 56th as a CIA air unit with special facilities at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida. Prouty believes, although he cannot confirm it, that the CIA may well remain in direct control of the 56th SOW today.

In the first year after the July 1962 Geneva Accords, which prohibited foreign military advisory personnel in



Laos, the CIA ran the war almost entirely through its own personnel, plus the aforementioned AA, CASI, 56th SOW and USAID Requirements Office. Soon, however, as the war effort grew, the CIA found itself having to utilize ever-increasing numbers of Americans from other groups.

First of all, there were active-duty U.S. military personnel, working in Laos out of uniform, to give the appearance that the Geneva Accords were being observed. Many of the men of the Air Force's clandestine unit known as Project 404 lived and worked in Laos but were officially registered as residing in Thailand. There was even a daily Udorn-Laos commuter flight, carrying 20 to 30 Air Force mechanics and weapons technicians in and out, morning and night. On any given day, there were many other U.S. active-duty personnel in Laos on TDY—temporary duty assignment. One such was Bob Anderson, who in 1967–1968 was an Air Force ordnance expert who was frequently sent in to Laos from Thailand for such tasks as defusing unexploded U.S. bombs that had been dropped on friendly villages. Anderson remembers he'd be given \$100 to buy civilian clothing and issued a USAID employee's card for his visits to Laos. There were also several thousand Green Berets on active duty in various secret enterprises from time to time. The Pentagon recently declassified a series of operations that went into southern Laos for missions involving everything from espionage to kidnappings and murder between 1965 and 1972. Although nominally under orders from the Pentagon, they were, in fact, controlled by the CIA out of Saigon. And finally, of course, any listing of U.S. military personnel actively involved in the war in Laos must include the hundreds of U.S. Air Force, Navy and Marine airmen who flew the 400 jet sorties and 15 B-52 raids that took place over Laos on a typical day in 1971, for example. It is, of course,

difficult to arrive at a full count of all the active-duty U.S. military personnel involved in support of that air war. One method, however, might utilize the following statistics: During 1971, the United States dropped a total of 626,279 tons of bombs on Indochina. Of these, 71 percent were dropped on Laos. At the same time, official records show 73,000 U.S. military personnel involved in the bombing. Since 70 percent of U.S. air strikes were devoted to Laos in 1971, one might argue that taking 70 percent of the U.S. personnel involved in the air war during that period gives us an indication of the number of Americans waging war against Laos from the outside. From this point of view, some 50,000 active-duty U.S. military personnel were thus employed on an average day in 1971.

Although directed by Americans, the bulk of the CIA secret army in Laos was, of course, made up of Asians. The troops over which the CIA had direct control, who did most of the fighting, consisted by 1971–1972 of 40,000 to 50,000 men.

Whenever I think of the Asian component of the CIA's army, I remember a Lao officer I met, a man in his early 30s who had been trained in the United States and spoke excellent English. He had been fighting for ten years. "The main thing I want you to tell the American people is that the Lao soldier does not want to fight," he said soon after we started talking. "We prefer peace with the Pathet Lao to fighting this war on and on for the Americans. They don't care anything about us." He grew very animated; his face reddened and he began gesticulating. "Let me give you an example. About a month or two ago, an American was shot down in a spotter plane east of Salaphoukhoun. The Americans made three battalions go out and try to rescue his corpse. Of course, the Pathet Lao were waiting and shot them up. Twenty-four men died for one American corpse." His voice rose to a shout. "Aren't these Lao men people? They have wives, they have families, they're not animals."

At that point, he excused himself to go to the bathroom. When he came back a few minutes later, weaving unsteadily from too much drink and too many memories, he tried to apologize. But he said, "Inside I really feel I hate you. I know it's not your fault. But I can't bear to see Americans anymore."

Such attitudes on the part of Asians serving in the CIA secret army were not uncommon. Indeed, one cannot begin to understand the way that army worked without recognizing first and foremost that its troops served without cause or

ideal. Most served because they had been forced to; others because they were paid to; others, the youngest ones, because it was all they knew. Understanding this, one understands why Americans were needed at every level to plan, support and command the fighting; why, nonetheless, the secret army was defeated at every turn.

Had the CIA's doings been more exposed to public scrutiny, its foibles, like those of the military in Vietnam, would have come to light. At least the CIA would have been more hampered than it was had the American press been carrying regular stories about its operations; had reporters been going out with some of the American pilots dropping the napalm we were officially not dropping, or bombing the villages we were officially not bombing, from planes marked ROYAL LAO AIR FORCE; had the press regularly reported on CIA knowledge and support of the opium trade in Laos—a traffic that came home to roost in terms of heroin addiction among our own troops in Vietnam—in a tacit *quid pro quo* with Laotian leaders; had the full cost of the CIA's war effort in Laos, unknown to this day, been revealed.

By turning to the CIA to run the operation in Laos, American leaders reaped the short-term benefit of being able to wage war without having to account for it to their own people. It is clear that the human costs of the CIA effort in Laos—massive bombing of civilian centers, the wiping of whole Laotian societies off the face of the earth, an estimated 1,000,000 refugees created—were a monstrous affront to the conscience of humanity. This immorality is often defended on the grounds that it was necessary for national security. But if there is any one major question posed by the CIA's behavior in Laos and elsewhere, it is that the CIA may have reached the point at which it has itself become a threat to our national security.

One well-known writer has described the CIA by quoting a member of his church who by chance had been one of the administrators of the Phoenix program, under which the CIA had thousands of Vietnamese killed on the unsupported allegation that they were Viet Cong sympathizers. When some fellow churchgoers asked the man how he rated Phoenix, he responded that while it hadn't been a success in Vietnam, due to faulty intelligence, the important thing was the experience they'd gotten for use back home. The former Phoenix official, the writer went on to explain, is now a high-ranking official in the internal-security division of the Justice Department.